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PREFACE 
The research for this paper was undertaken in preparation for the 26th IQ-Net meeting held 
in Steiermark, Austria, on 3-5 June 2009. The paper was written by Fiona Wishlade and 
Rona Michie. 
This paper is the product of desk research and fieldwork visits during Spring 2009. The 
fieldwork involved interviews with all of the partners in the IQ-Net consortium, as well as 
with State aid specialists outside the Managing Authorities at both national and regional 
level. In addition, interviews were conducted with European Commission staff in DG 
Competition and DG Regio. Given the nature of the topic under discussion, an explicit 
commitment was given at interview that confidentiality would be respected and sensitive 
material or comments would not be attributed to particular respondents or institutions. The 
field research team comprised: 
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x Rona Michie, Dr Martin Ferry (United Kingdom) 
This paper was revised following the Schloss Seggau meeting in line with the comments of 
the partners and the substance of discussions at the meeting.  
EPRC thanks all those who participated in the research. EPRC also gratefully acknowledges 
the financial support provided by participating Member States and regions, whose 
contributions are co-financed by technical assistance from the European Structural Funds. 
The report is, however, the responsibility of the authors alone. The partners in the IQ-Net 
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x State Government of Steiermark, Economic Policy Department 
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x Agency for the Economy of Vlaanderen, Europe Economy 
Czech Republic  
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Denmark 
x Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority 
Finland 
x Alliance of Länsi-Suomi 
x Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
France 
x Délégation interministérielle à laménagement et à la compétitivité des 
territoires (DIACT) 
Germany 
x Nordrhein-Westfalen, Ministry of Economy, SMEs and Energy, EU Affairs Unit 
x Sachsen-Anhalt, Ministry of Finance 
Greece 
x CSF Management Organisation Unit, Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Italy 
x Lombardia Region, Presidency, Central Directorate for Integrated Programming 
x Ministry of Economic Development 
x Institute for Industrial Promotion (IPI) 
Poland 
x ĦlĎskie Voivodeship (Marshals Office) 
Portugal 
x Financial Institute for Regional Development (IFDR) 
Spain 
x País Vasco, Provincial Council of Bizkaia, Department of Economy and Finance 
Slovenia 
x Government Office for Local Self-Government and Regional Policy, 
EU Cohesion Policy Department 
Sweden 
x Tillväxtverket, Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth 
United Kingdom 
x Department of Communities and Local Government 
x ONE NorthEast 
x Scottish Government 
x Welsh European Funding Office 
For further information about IQ-Net, and access to the full series of IQ-Net Papers, please 
visit the IQ-Net website at: www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet/default.cfm 
Disclaimer: 
It should be noted that the content and conclusions of this paper do not necessarily 
represent the views of individual members of the IQ-Net Consortium. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper explores the issues surrounding the conceptual and practical difficulties involved 
in reconciling EU Cohesion and competition policies; specifically, how State aid compliance 
issues coincide or otherwise with the requirements of the Structural Funds Regulations. It 
examines which issues are most relevant to Structural Funds Managing Authorities, and how 
they are addressing compliance. It focuses on three core aspects: (i) the definition of State 
aids (ii) interpretation of the exceptions to the general prohibition on State aid; and (iii) 
the mechanisms operated at EU and domestic levels to ensure compliance.  
The paper draws on a mix of desk research and interviews with staff working on the 
implementation of Structural Funds programmes and in State aid compliance. The desk-
based research focused on EU legislation and guidelines, case law and Commission decisions 
as well as documentation available at the national level. The interviews were undertaken in 
fifteen Member States with a range of Managing Authorities, Intermediate Bodies, Certifying 
Authorities, programme secretariats, national coordination bodies and State aid compliance 
units and individual State aid specialists. In addition, interviews were carried out with DG 
Regio and DG Comp. Although not selected as a representative sample, the range of 
national and regional authorities interviewed for this research reflects experiences from 
most parts of the EU and encompasses programmes accounting for a sizeable share of total 
Structural Funds expenditure in 2007-13. 
Definitional issues associated with State aid 
In principle, the granting of State aid is prohibited, subject to certain exceptions and any 
plans to offer aid must first be notified to the Commission. The EU Treaty does not, 
however, define precisely what a State aid actually is. The challenge for domestic 
authorities is to decide which measures require notification. Failure to notify a measure 
which is subsequently found to involve aid may result in the repayment of aid granted.   
Although a clear and consistent definition of what constitutes a State aid has yet to 
emerge, the terms of the Treaty provide a starting point (the main provisions on State aid 
control are set out under Articles 87 to 89). Building on these, a working definition has 
emerged from extensive case law and decision practice. The Treaty provisions are based 
round five cumulative criteria which must be met for a measure to involve aid; these 
criteria are explored in the paper. Key definitional issues which are crucial for the 
identification of State aid and which have been identified as problematic among IQ-Net 
partners include: the concept of advantage, the interpretation of State resources, the 
definition of undertakings and economic activity and the lack of tangible criteria for 
assessing whether a given measure could affect trade between Member States.  
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Irritation was expressed over the reach of competition policy in areas considered to have 
no significant competition impact, the resource implications of considering whether State 
aid was involved and the uncertainty arising in borderline cases. The practical 
consequences of this evolving definition of State aid and its lack of sharp edges for 
Structural Fund Managing Authorities are found in the problems they have experienced co-
financing particular project types through the Structural Funds. The most problematic 
project types include: infrastructure projects; urban regeneration; projects with social 
objectives; and cross-sectoral projects.  
With a view to focusing its resources on the most distortive cases of aid, the Commission 
has determined that so-called de minimis aid can be said to fall outside the scope of the 
prohibition. The de minimis facility has come to be widely used in many Member States, 
and is commonly viewed as a relatively straightforward way to ensure compliance. 
However, it is widely acknowledged that its use may be less straightforward than it might 
appear, particularly in relation to the required monitoring of the level of aids received by 
beneficiaries from all State sources. IQ-Net partner programmes take different approaches 
to monitoring the use of de minimis, some of these are described in the paper.  
The scope of admissible aid 
In spite of the general ban on State aid control, State aid discipline is characterised by a 
large body of hard and soft law setting out exceptions to the prohibition, enabling aid 
measures to be used in a range of policy areas relevant to Structural Fund programmes, 
such as regional development, research, development and innovation aid and SME support: 
x For some of the IQ-Net partner countries/regions the Regional Aid Guidelines 
provide considerable flexibility, while elsewhere, coverage is much more 
fragmented and in many regions is significantly lower than in the previous planning 
period.  
x SME aid is widely used under the Structural Funds programmes, with few 
compliance or compatibility issues among the IQ-Net partners. 
x State aid rules for R&D&I were cited as being more problematic, with limitations 
arising from the large role played by the State in research activity, constraints on 
the commercialisation of the R&D activities of universities, problems with the 
funding of clusters and difficulties with the interpretation of the different phases of 
the R&D process. More generally, there was a perception that the State aid rules 
made the Lisbon objectives more difficult to address, notably because of the 
emphasis on funding research projects rather than research infrastructure. In 
addition, the rules are perceived to be complex to administer, and the levels of aid 
which can be offered and scope of eligible expenditure is widely considered to be 
too low to be attractive. 
x In the context of financial engineering measures, there was a widespread degree of 
exasperation among the IQ-Net partners. While on the one hand DG Regio has 
actively promoted the use of more innovative instruments, the requisite degree of 
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coordination with respect to ensuring the compliance of measures such as JESSICA 
and JEREMIE has not been in evidence.  
The final part of this section of the paper discusses the temporary framework for State aid 
measures adopted by the Commission in December 2008 to support access to finance in the 
financial and economic crisis. The temporary framework comprises both new instruments 
and the (temporary) modification of existing instruments. Since the introduction of the 
Framework a large number of measures has been approved by the Commission, but it 
remains to be seen precisely what impact this new facility will have on the Structural Funds 
programmes.  
Institutional and procedural arrangements for ensuring compliance with the State aid 
rules 
There is considerable evidence that State aid issues are being taken more seriously in the 
current planning period that previously and that there is greater awareness of, and 
expertise in, the rules than before. This trend is partly a result of the change in the 
Structural Funds regulations which makes compliance with the State aid rules the 
responsibility of the Managing Authority (although the formal position under the Treaty 
remains unchanged). In parallel, there has been a seismic shift in approach to compliance 
at the European level with scrutiny of individual measures by the Commission increasingly 
replaced with a self certification approach.  
There is a range of actors with a vested interest in State aid compliance  the European 
Commission, national governments (as formal addressees of decisions), Managing 
Authorities and beneficiaries (who may have to reimburse aid). Beyond this, there is a large 
number of intermediaries involved in actually or potentially providing aid co-financed by 
the Structural Funds, whose policy is shaped by the State aid rules and whose policy 
objectives may be frustrated by them. Last, but by no means least, in many jurisdictions, 
there are specialised State aid units, fulfilling an important guidance, advisory and training 
role, although rarely a statutory function.  
The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) which entered into force on in 2008 
obviates the need for prior notification and approval of aid schemes in areas where the 
Commission has defined the circumstances in which it will find aid to be compatible with 
the common market. The principal rationale for this approach is to reduce the 
administrative burden on the Commission which, in the past, had committed considerable 
resources to rubber stamping aid schemes that were in line with the guidelines. In those 
IQ-Net partner programmes which do make use of the GBER, there is positive response to 
the flexibility and room for manoeuvre offered. Others, however, viewed the GBER as 
simply a compilation of existing rules providing no real benefit and still requiring 
considerable interpretation.  
There may be circumstances in which aid requires notification. Notification to the 
Commission is often preceded by informal contact with a view to ascertaining the main 
issues likely to arise before the formal process begins; this may help to shorten the 
decision-making process. IQ-Net partner show very different attitudes to the notification 
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process: for some IQ-Net partners, it is the last resort after de minimis, GBER and existing 
schemes have been explored; for others, it is seen as the safest way for aid schemes in 
doubt. Programmes which have gone down the route of making many formal notifications of 
aid schemes to the Commission, however, reported a significant resultant administrative 
burden.  
In April 2009 the Commission adopted a so-called Simplification Package aimed at 
improving the transparency, effectiveness and predictability of State aid procedures; in 
particular, the package partly formalises the prenotification stage for certain types of aid. 
The key elements of this package are described in the paper, but its practical implications 
remains to be seen. 
The final part of this section describes Managing Authorities structures and processes to 
ensure compliance with State aid rules, including the role played by national competition 
authorities, the availability of State aid expertise within programmes, and the training and 
capacity building activities that are taking place within IQ-Net partner regions.  
Conclusions 
A number of key trends and tensions emerge from the paper: 
x State aid principles drafted over half a century ago are often difficult to apply today. 
x In practice, the definition of State aid has become increasingly conflated with issues of 
compatibility. 
x There is greater awareness of State aid compliance issues in the current planning period 
than in the past. 
x Compliance with the State aid rules is a major source of anxiety for many domestic 
policymakers. 
x There are significant asymmetries of risk in the compliance process. 
x The technical demands of compliance are considerable. 
x The constraints imposed by State aid compliance may frustrate the achievement of the 
objectives of Cohesion policy.  
x State aid compliance under the Structural Funds may be greater than under purely 
domestic policies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between EU Competition policy and EU Cohesion policy is at best one of 
ambiguity and at worst one of direct conflict. While EU Cohesion policy explicitly intervenes 
to alter economic outcomes, EU Competition policy aims to ensure that State intervention 
does not interfere with the smooth functioning of the internal market or distort 
competition to an extent contrary to the common interest. 
EU Competition policy predates EU Cohesion policy by several decades. EU Cohesion policy 
in its current form dates back to the end of the 1980s, which saw the radical restructuring 
and upgrading of a policy that had until then largely been an adjunct to national regional 
policies. By contrast, EU Competition policy was enshrined in the Treaty from the outset. It 
is clear that, back in the 1950s, the authors of the Treaty perceived the risks to the 
common market that lay in allowing Member States unfettered use of subsidies. Moreover, 
although the original provisions have been subject to extensive interpretation, the 
fundamental principle has remained unchanged since the outset: State aid which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition in the EU is prohibited, subject to certain exceptions.  
Given this background, EU-sponsored intervention in the form of the Structural Funds 
arguably sits uneasily with the precepts of State aid control. Indeed, the scope for conflict 
was clearly recognised in the 1988 Structural Funds reforms under which the Regulation 
specified that the Funds should, among other things, comply with competition policy.1 
Notwithstanding this early and explicit requirement, there remain significant conceptual 
and practical difficulties in reconciling EU Cohesion and Competition policies. In the late 
1980s, these were thrown into sharp relief by the high-profile dispute between the 
Commissioners for Regional and Competition policies over the lack of coincidence between 
the national and Structural Fund assisted area maps. Of course, such difficulties are by no 
means restricted to transactions involving the Structural Funds, although the scope for 
conflict between two spheres of EU policy certainly adds poignancy. However, the 
Structural Funds Regulations impose specific requirements on the Member States which 
make State aid compliance issues of particular relevance to Structural Fund Managing 
Authorities.  
The aim of this paper is to explore those issues and examine how they have been addressed 
in practice. It draws on a mix of desk research and interviews with staff working on the 
implementation of Structural Funds programmes and in State aid compliance. The desk-
based research focused on EU legislation and guidelines, case law and Commission decisions 
as well as documentation available at the national level. The interviews were undertaken in 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their 
effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the operation of 
the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments, OJEC No. L 185/9 of 15 
July 1988. 
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fifteen Member States with a range of Managing Authorities, Intermediate Bodies, Certifying 
Authorities, programme secretariats, national coordination bodies and State aid compliance 
unit and individual State aid specialists. In addition, interviews were carried out in DG 
Regio and DG Comp. Although not selected as a representative sample, the range of 
national and regional authorities interviewed for this research reflects experiences from 
most parts of the EU and encompasses programmes accounting for a sizeable share of total 
Structural Funds expenditure in 2007-13. 
The structure of this report is driven by the architecture of the regulatory framework for 
State aid, and draws on specific issues of concern to IQ-Net partner countries/regions. 
x Section 2 examines definitional issues associated with State aid. This is a crucial 
matter since, in principle, State aid is prohibited, subject to certain exceptions and 
any plans to offer aid must first be notified to the Commission. The Treaty does 
not, however, define precisely what a State aid actually is. The challenge for 
domestic authorities is to decide which measures require notification.  
x Section 3 reviews the scope of admissible aid. In spite of the general ban on State 
aid control, State aid discipline is characterised by a large body of hard and soft 
law setting out exceptions to the prohibition enabling aid measures to be used in 
policy areas such as regional development, research, development and innovation 
aid and SME support. This section focuses on the exceptions of most relevance to 
Structural Fund programmes, highlighting particular issues or difficulties 
experienced in implementation.  
x Section 4 is primarily concerned with the institutional and procedural arrangements 
for ensuring compliance with the State aid rules. It begins with an outline of the EU 
framework, but focuses on the structures and mechanisms operated both formally 
and informally within the Member States and especially within the Managing 
Authorities.  
x Section 5 concludes by highlighting some key areas of difficulty where tensions 
remain unresolved.  
2. DEFINING STATE AID  
The notion of what constitutes a State aid is clearly fundamental to being able discipline it, 
but the EC Treaty presents domestic policymakers with a conundrum insofar as it contains 
no precise definition of what is subject to control. It has been argued that this was 
probably deliberate2  if Member States knew the exact scope of the notion of aid, they 
could easily devise measures which would not satisfy all of the requirements, and the 
absence of an exact definition allows the Commission and the Courts to interpret the notion 
in a wide and flexible way. It is plausible to believe that such a view prevailed at the time, 
but it is also questionable whether the authors of the Treaty envisaged the extensive scope 
                                                 
2 Schina, D. (1987) State Aids under the EEC Treaty Article 92 to 92, ESC Publishing, Oxford. 
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of the definition which has emerged. Nevertheless, the definitional issue is crucial since it 
determines whether or not a given measure requires to be notified to the Commission. As a 
result, domestic policymakers must make some a priori assessment of whether a measure 
involves aid in order to decide if it needs to be notified. Moreover, failure to notify a 
measure which is subsequently found to involve aid may result in the repayment of aid 
granted.   
A clear and consistent definition of what constitutes a State aid has yet to emerge from 
Commission and Court decision-making. Nevertheless, the terms of the Treaty provide a 
starting point which, through extensive case law and decision practice, has resulted in a 
working definition. The first part of this section explores the various dimensions of the 
definition of State aid before examining the practical consequences of the current state of 
play for Structural Fund Managing Authorities (see 2.1). The wide scope of the definition of 
State aid has had considerable resource implications for the Commission, not least since the 
Court has held that there is no level below which aid can be said not to have any effect  
simply that, the smaller the amount of aid, the less its negative effects are likely to be: 
Where the benefit is limited, competition is distorted to a lesser extent, but it is still 
distorted.3 Nevertheless, with a view to focusing its resources on the most distortive cases 
of aid, the Commission has determined that so-called de minimis aid can be said to fall 
outside the scope of the prohibition. The second part of this section sets out the main 
criteria for de minimis aid, considers the implications of the rules and outlines IQ-Net 
partner approaches to their implementation (see 2.2). 
2.1 What is a State aid? 
The main provisions on State aid control are set out in the EC Treaty under Articles 87 to 
89. Article 87(1) establishes a basic, though not unqualified, prohibition of State aid: 
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common 
market. 
This provision gives rise to five criteria which are summarised in Box 1. These criteria are 
cumulative  all must be met for a measure to involve aid  and each has given rise to a vast 
body of case law and legal literature.4 An in-depth discussion of each of these is well 
beyond the scope this short paper, but some exploration of these elements is clearly in 
order as a backdrop to the compliance of the Structural Funds with the State aid rules. 
                                                 
3 T-214/95 Vlaamse Gewest v European Commission [1998] ECR-II 71, para 46.  
4 Recent examples include Nicolaides, P., Kekelekis, M. and Kleis, M. (2008) State Aid Policy in the 
European Community, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, and Bacon, K. (2009) European 
Community Law of State Aid, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
EU Cohesion Policy and State Aid Compliance 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 24(2)          European Policies Research Centre 4
Box 1: Criteria for measures to involve State aid 
x The measure must confer a benefit or advantage on the recipient which it would not 
otherwise have received; 
x it must be granted by the State / through State resources; 
x it must favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods; 
x it must distort or threaten to distort competition; 
x it must affect trade between the Member States. 
The sections that follow discuss each of these criteria in turn before considering their 
practical implications across a range of projects types identified in discussion with the IQ-
Net partner countries/regions. 
2.1.1 Benefit  or advantage 
In order to be caught by Article 87(1), a measure must provide a benefit or advantage 
which the recipient would not have received under normal market conditions. In the case of 
classic forms of aid  such as grants or loans at below market rates  the benefit is easy to 
identify. However, complex issues may arise in the case of other forms of intervention, 
such as capital injections or equity participation by the public sector, the provision or sale 
of assets or services by public authorities or the procurement of public services. A number 
of principles have been developed over time to deal with such transactions, but the notion 
of a benefit or advantage cannot yet be considered to have been defined conclusively. As a 
result a detailed, case-by-case examination may be required to determine whether a 
benefit exists. 
The so-called private investor principle5 has become an important criterion in assessing 
whether particular transactions  notably, but not exclusively, loans, guarantees and capital 
injections - involve State aid; according to this, if a public authority acts in the same way 
as a private investor would conceivably have done in the same circumstances, then no 
benefit is conferred. This can include the possibility of accepting short-term losses if this 
consistent with longer-term gains, but would exclude wider policy considerations such as 
regional development or job maintenance, for example. 
The Commission has also issued guidance on land sales6 by public authorities which sets out 
the procedures for ensuring that a normal market price is paid, and no aid is therefore 
involved. Essentially, such sales must either be the subject of an open and unconditional 
bidding process or follow an independent valuation of the assets in order for there not to be 
a benefit to the purchaser. 
A further issue which has given rise to a growing body of case law concerns whether there is 
an advantage inherent in the compensation paid by public authorities for the execution of 
                                                 
5 This has been elaborated through a series of cases dating back to the 1980s  see Bacon op cit, pp 
41-50 for a detailed consideration of the relevant case law. 
6 Commission communication concerning aid elements in land sales by public authorities, OJEC No C 
209/3 of 10 July 1997.  
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services of general economic interest (SGEI).7 The precise contours of the advantage 
continue to evolve, but in a landmark decision (the Altmark case),8 the Court concluded 
that compensation for the fulfilment of public service obligations does not constitute an 
advantage provided that the following four conditions are met: 
x the public service obligations are clearly defined; 
x the compensation is calculated in an objective and transparent manner; 
x the compensation does not exceed the cost of discharging the relevant public 
service obligations, plus a reasonable profit; 
x the level of compensation is based on an analysis of the costs which a typical, well-
run undertaking would have incurred, unless the undertaking is chosen following a 
public procurement procedure. 
The key questions to address in considering whether there is an advantage to the recipient 
are highlighted in Box 2. 
Box 2: Checklist: is there an advantage to the recipient? 
x Does the measure reduce the costs that the recipient would normally have to bear? If 
no, there is no advantage. 
x Where the public authority provides or sells assets or services, does this take place on 
an open and competitive basis? If yes, there is no advantage. 
x Where the public authority invests, lends or guarantees funds, does it do so on the 
same basis as a private investor would? If yes, there is no advantage. 
x Where the public authority compensates an undertaking for carrying out public service 
obligations, does this compensation meet the Altmark criteria? If yes, there is no 
advantage. 
 
2.1.2 State and State resources 
Article 87(1) is concerned with the actions of the State and State resources. However, 
somewhat contrary to the precise wording of the Treaty, it is now clear that State and 
State resources are cumulative requirements, not alternatives.9 This means that the 
measure must be the action of the State and involve a transfer of funds. For example, a 
regulatory measure which reduces the costs to an undertaking but which does not involve a 
cost to the State is not State aid.  
                                                 
7 SGEI are not defined in EU law but generally concern services that either the market does not 
provide or not to the extent and or quality desired by the public authorities, and which are in the 
general interest  examples include public transport, postal services, public service broadcasting and 
utilities. 
8 C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH, Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark 
GmbH, ECR I-7747.  
9 C-397/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] I-2099. 
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State is broadly defined and includes subnational authorities and agencies acting on 
behalf of public authorities. It may also include the actions of private undertakings in which 
the State has a holding, if those actions can be attributed to the State.  
State resources clearly include central government and subnational authority budgets 
derived from taxation; they also include funds from compulsory levies over which the public 
authorities have control, revenues foregone and resources such as lottery funding where 
the public authorities have scope to control their distribution. The treatment of Community 
resources  and the Structural Funds specifically  has been a vexed question for some. 
Formally, Community resources are not State resources;10 however, the legal services of 
the Commission have confirmed that once the Structural Funds come under the control of 
the Member States, they become State resources and the decisions on how they are 
expended are attributable to the State.11 From a rational perspective it could, arguably, 
hardly be otherwise.12 The differential treatment of Structural Funds and national 
resources in the context of funding State aid would lead to divergent aid intensities 
depending on the origin of the monies concerned. Nevertheless, historically, at least, there 
is considerable evidence of decidedly uneven interpretations of the status of Structural 
Funds as State aid among the Managing Authorities. 
The main issues to consider in determining whether a measure is provided by the State and 
through State resources are summarised in Box 3. 
Box 3: Checklist: is the measure provided by the State and through State resources? 
x Is there a cost to the public purse, including the Structural Funds, whether in budgetary 
terms or revenue foregone? If yes, there are State resources involved. 
x Can the action be attributed to national or subnational government, agents acting on 
their behalf or bodies in which the State has a controlling interest? If yes, the action is 
attributable to the State. 
x Are both the above conditions met? If yes, the measure is provided by the State and 
through State resources. 
 
2.1.3 Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
The notion of undertaking is neutral as to ownership or legal status. The term is not 
defined in EU law, but it is established that it may be public or private, voluntary, 
charitable or not-for-profit, involve a group of organisations or a public-private partnership 
                                                 
10 This stems from a case concerning tariff quotas where the Court held that The financial advantage 
which traders derive from receiving a share in a Community tariff quota is not granted through State 
resources because the levy which is waived is part of Community resources it may not be regarded 
as State aid or aid granted through State resources; Cases 213-215/81 Norddeutsches Vieh- und 
Fleischkontor Herbert Will and others v Bundesanstalt für landwirschaftliche Marktordnung [1982] 
ECR 3582. 
11 Moreover, this extends to resources under the EEA/Norwegian Financial Mechanism; see 
Commission Decision N 220/2008 - Latvia: EEA/Norwegian Financial Mechanism priority "Conservation 
of European cultural heritage"  SIA BC GROUP individual project "Second Life: Restoration of Wooden 
Cultural Heritage at Kalnciema/Melnsila quarter in Riga", 2 October 2008. 
12 But for an alternative view see Nicolaides, P. (2005) Puzzles of State Aid: Structural Funds, 
Cumulation and De minimis, European State Aid Quarterly, 3, pp433-440.  
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or indeed a self-employed individual; the key is not the status of the organisation, but 
rather that it must be engaged in an economic activity in order for Article 87(1) to apply. 
Economic activity is broadly defined as any activity consisting in offering goods or services 
on a given market.13 Some activities are non-economic owing to the exclusive 
competence of the State  the issuing of passports is an example. Similarly, the social 
nature of the activity may render it non-economic  the provision of national health, social 
security or education systems are regarded as non-economic activities. On the other hand, 
the status of an activity as economic or not also depends on the terms on which the goods 
or services are supplied  healthcare and pensions are obvious examples. Even if an entity 
provides services totally free-of-charge to users or customers and is financed entirely by 
the State, it can still be an undertaking  museums and libraries, for example, cannot be 
excluded from the scope of undertaking on this basis. On the other hand, where such 
beneficiaries do not qualify as undertakings (because of the nature of the activity), then 
the financing involved is a transfer of funds within the State, which does not constitute 
State aid.14 
The notions of undertaking and, related, economic activity emerged as particularly 
problematic from discussions with the IQ-Net partners, but there is also evidence of a shift 
in perceptions between the previous and current programme periods. For some, 
undertaking has, historically, been viewed as synonymous with private firm, with the 
result that unless a private enterprise was involved in a given project or scheme, 
consideration was not really given as to whether a measure might involve State aid. There 
is evidence that this perception still persists in some quarters  particularly at the sub-
regional level. However, in general there is a recognition that undertaking relates not to 
the legal status or form of the organisation, but rather to whether it is involved in an 
economic activity.  
The widening of the concept of undertaking places more emphasis on the definition of 
economic activity. This was widely viewed as a difficult issue among the IQ-Net partners 
since it has the scope to include aspects of social and public services, as well as charitable 
and voluntary activities; even if an entity provides its services totally free of charge and is 
entirely financed by the State, it can still be regarded as undertaking in respect of those 
activities that are regarded as economic. Although in practice State aid could often be 
ruled out, many IQ-Net partners expressed the view that State aid issues should not enter 
into the analysis of such projects at all and that the potential reach of competition policy 
in this respect was too extensive. Moreover, there was a degree of irritation at the resource 
implications of considering whether State aid was involved in what were perceived, from a 
common sense point of view, to be instances with no significant competition implications. 
In addition, there were often concerns at the uncertainty arising in borderline cases where 
                                                 
13 C-222/04 Ministero dellEconomia e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze [2006] ECR I-289, 
para 108.  
14 It follows that an entity can be regarded as an undertaking for some of its activities and not for 
others. For example, a museum organising a exhibition on a commercial basis would be regarded as 
an undertaking, but in its involvement in the provision of educational activities for primary school 
children would not. 
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policymakers decided to rely on their own judgement  that a measure did not constitute 
aid - rather than notify for certainty.  
In order for a measure to involve State aid, it must be selective. Aid is selective if it applies 
to a particular type of activity, a sector of the economy, a particular geographical area or 
to firms with the same characteristics. In this way, a line is drawn between measures of 
general economic policy  such as the rate of corporation tax or bank base rates  and 
measures which directly or indirectly assist a particular class of undertaking. The selectivity 
test has spawned a large of body of case law and is arguably the most difficult of the tests 
to apply. However, in practice, it presents fewer problems in the context of the Structural 
Funds. This is because, in most cases, funding will concern either specific projects or 
measures that are restricted to the programme area concerned; in other words, the nature 
of the intervention is by definition selective. Box 4 identifies the main factors which 
determine whether a measure fulfils the selectivity criterion. 
Box 4: Checklist: does the measure favour certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods? 
x Does the measure benefit an economic activity  i.e. an activity in which there is a 
market for the goods or services concerned? If yes, the beneficiary is an undertaking, 
irrespective of its legal status. 
x Does the measure discriminate between undertakings on the basis of their size, 
location, activity or other characteristics? If yes, the measure is selective. 
x Do decisions about eligibility involve administrative or policymaker discretion? If yes, 
the measure is selective.  
 
2.1.4 Distorts or threatens to distort  competit ion 
The requirement that a measure must distort or threaten to distort competition in order to 
be caught by Article 87(1) is not a seriously limiting factor in the definition of a State aid. 
Indeed, it could be argued that, if the measure fulfils the selectivity criterion, then it is 
also likely to have the capacity to improve the competitive position of a given undertaking, 
and therefore to distort competition. In short, there is a virtual presumption of an impact 
on competition; while the Court has held that an impact on competition cannot simply be 
assumed by the Commission without any consideration of the likely effects of a measure,15 
the level of proof required is low; the Commission is: 
not required to carry out an economic analysis of the actual situation on the 
relevant market, of the market share of the undertakings in receipt of the aid, of 
the position of competing undertakings and of trade flows of the services in 
question between Member States.16  
                                                 
15 T-34/02 Le Levant 001 and others v Commission [2006] ECR II-267.  
16 T-55/99 Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías (CETM) v European Commission 
[2000] ECR II-3207, para 102. 
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As a result, domestic policymakers would be ill-advised to conclude that a measure did not 
constitute State aid simply on the basis that it did not, or did not have the potential to, 
distort competition. 
This characteristic has contributed to the broad nature of the definition of State aid and 
made it difficult to eliminate from the scope of the general prohibition measures that 
would widely be viewed as innocuous from a competition perspective. This in turn had 
resource implications for the Commission, whose response was to introduce a de minimis 
rule  i.e. a level of aid below which Article 87(1) could be said not to apply. This is 
discussed in more detail in section 2.2 below. 
2.1.5 Affects trade between Member States 
The impact of a measure on trade between Member States is closely linked to its capacity 
to distort competition  a measure which affects trade will certainly be viewed as distorting 
competition, although the converse is not necessarily true. As a result, only measures that 
support activities in which the trade is purely local are likely to fall outside the definition 
of State aid  such as a single business engaged in local services (e.g. hairdressing) or 
household trades (e.g. painting and decorating).  
In practice, most goods and services are traded between Member States, and this criterion 
applies whether or not the recipient itself is actually involved in intra-EU trade. Moreover, 
the Commission and Court have been reluctant clearly to define the circumstances in which 
trade is not affected. In consequence, such examples are relatively few and far between. 
They include a German swimming pool used by local residents,17 a small museum in Alsace18 
and the restoration of Brighton Pier (in the United Kingdom).19 By contrast, the Court did 
find an impact on trade in respect of tax credits paid to Austrian dentists on the basis that 
it is not inconceivable that medical practitioners specialising in dentistry might be 
in competition with their colleagues established in another EU Member State.20 In short, 
the very small number of cases in which there has been a finding of no effect on trade, 
coupled with the absence of any quantitative test  there is no threshold below which trade 
can be said not to be affected - means that an effect on trade can usually be presumed. As 
will be seen, the Commission has attempted to sharpen this criterion in the so-called 
simplification package (see 4.1.3 below), but it is as yet unclear what practical difference 
the cited precedents will make. 
Several IQ-Net partners expressed frustration at the lack of tangible criteria for assessing 
whether a given measure could affect trade between Member States. Some observed that a 
finding of State aid could hinge on small differences between projects  including proximity 
to national borders - which in turn could make the difference between a project being 
viable (because Structural Funds cofinancing rates could be used) or abandoned (because 
the prevailing State aid rate applied). Moreover, the decisions published by the Commission 
                                                 
17 Commission Decision N 258/00 - Germany: Freizeitbad Dorsten, 12 January 2001.  
18 Commission Decision NN136/A/02 - France: Mesures concernant lEcomusée dAlsace, 21 January 
2003. 
19 Commission Decision N560/01 and NN17/02 - United Kingdom: Brighton west Pier, 9 April 2002. 
20 C-172/03 Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, [2005] ECR-I 1627, para 35. 
EU Cohesion Policy and State Aid Compliance 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 24(2)          European Policies Research Centre 10
in the form of letters to the Member State concerned were often insufficiently precise to 
be used as precedents.  
A recent example concerns aid for culture in Hungary.21 The Commission makes clear just 
how broad the concepts of undertakings and economic activity can be, noting that 
cultural centres could qualify as undertakings even if they are directly managed by the 
municipality and their operation is not contracted out, that libraries may be classed as 
undertakings since they compete with bookshops and that museums in general should be 
viewed as undertakings. The Commission acknowledges that many of the activities 
concerned are of a purely local nature  for example, it notes that the upgrading of a 
community centre in a small village is unlikely to affect intra-community trade. However, 
in its decision, the Commission does not distinguish between those parts of the measure 
that affect trade between Member States and those that do not. This might be regarded as 
a missed opportunity to provide guidance for domestic policymakers since the objectives 
[of the measure in question] are very narrowly and precisely defined in the form of a quasi-
exhaustive list of eligible projects. Instead, the Commission concludes that certain parts 
of the scheme do not qualify as aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the EC Treaty, while 
the parts that do qualify as aid in the same sense are compatible under Article 87 3) d) of 
the Treaty. This was clearly a positive outcome for the Hungarian scheme as a whole, but 
since the decision effectively blurred the boundaries between the definition of State aid 
under Article 87(1) and the compatibility of aid with the Treaty under Article 87(3), it 
provides scant guidance to other policymakers as to which measures require approval. 
2.1.6 Some practical consequences of definit ional problems 
The evolving definition of State aid and its lack of sharp edges have practical 
consequences for particular project types which are frequently cofinanced through the 
Structural Funds. Infrastructure projects were cited by a number of IQ-Net respondents as 
presenting particular difficulties in State aid assessment. Examples include small-scale 
tourist infrastructure, where the effect on trade is difficult to gauge in a way that 
definitively rules out the possibility of State aid. Also perceived as problematic is the lack 
of a working definition of the difference between general and specific infrastructure; one 
region cited difficult issues arising from the operation of a conference centre owned by a 
local authority and another called for a more precise definition of firm-specific 
infrastructure. Investments such as incubator units for firms continue to cause problems in 
domestic policymaker assessments of whether State aid is involved and, if so, how 
compliance can be achieved. A key difficulty here is in determining the different level(s) of 
potential aid beneficiary  e.g. the operator of the incubator and/or its tenants  especially 
if complex public private partnership arrangements also pertain. 
Some partners take a very cautious line on definitional issues relating to infrastructure, 
notifying cases which they perceive ought to fall outside the scope of State aid; the 
resulting scrutiny, however, fuels a degree of resentment at the reach of Commission 
intervention in this sphere. Others take a more pragmatic approach, preferring to develop 
                                                 
21 Commission Decision N293/2008  Hungary: Aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, 
museums, public libraries, 26 November 2008.  
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and document a robust defence as to why a particular project does not involve State aid (in 
the event of a challenge) rather than involve the Commission at all. A third way, which is 
considerably more risky, but nevertheless in evidence, is a passive assumption that no State 
aid issues arise. 
Partly related to the issue of State aid and infrastructure, several IQ-Net partners 
mentioned difficulties with urban regeneration projects. Urban regeneration is not 
explicitly provided for by the Commission under the exceptions to the general ban.22 
Instead, there is a Staff working document23 which argues that a formal regeneration 
framework based upon limited experience can quickly turn out to restrict choices and 
options. It opts instead to set out aspects of the State aid rules of relevance to urban 
regeneration with respect to definitional issues, the role of services of general economic 
interest and the scope for urban regeneration measures to be handled under the 
derogations related to other policy areas, such as training, culture and heritage, SMEs and 
regional aid;24 it also lists a number of regeneration schemes which it has approved. As with 
other definitional aspects, however, the guidance is insufficiently precise for domestic 
policymakers to conclude with certainty that no State aid issues arise.  
The United Kingdom government has argued for a more formal and predictable framework 
for dealing with land and property market failures.25 This position is partly the legacy of 
the Commissions 1999 decision on the United Kingdoms English Partnerships PIP scheme,26 
the loss of which was widely viewed as a disaster at the time since the replacement 
schemes which the Commission would allow were viewed as inadequate.27 In this context, 
the United Kingdom authorities identified a number of projects perceived to be put at risk 
by the State aid rules. These include projects in pockets of deprivation or derelict land 
outside the assisted areas map (which means that regional aid ceilings do not apply) or 
projects comprising multiple elements  e.g. land remediation, historic buildings, new build 
and development - where the lack of clarity in the rules and the complexity in applying 
different rules to different elements of the project makes administration costly and 
complicated. More generally, the fact that direct development by public authorities falls 
outside the State aid rules even where it arguably impinges on private sector markets, but 
that support payments for private sector led regeneration falls within them is arguably 
anomalous given the higher public cost of the former and the principle of equal treatment 
of public and private undertakings enshrined in the Treaty. This position was reiterated in a 
recent United Kingdom response to a Commission consultation where it was claimed that: 
In areas like this the Commission winks at non-notification from most Member States on 
                                                 
22 Exceptions to the prohibition are discussed in Section 3, below.  
23 State aid control and regeneration of deprived urban areas - Vademecum, undated document, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/vademecum.pdf  
24 Many of these have been revised since the Vademecum was published.  
25 State aid support for land and property development in sustainable communities- UK proposals for 
reform, URN 06/1661 available at: www.berr.gov.uk/files/file32867.pdf  
26 Commission Decision of 22 December 1999 on aid scheme C39/99 - United Kingdom: English 
Partnerships (EP) under the Partnership Investment Programme (PIP), OJEC No L 145/27 of 20 June 
2000. 
27 House of Commons, Transport, Local Government and the Regions Committee (2002) The Need for 
a New European Regeneration Framework Twelfth Report of Session 2001-2, HC 483-I. 
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a massive scale despite the strong possibility that many such grants would be found to be 
State aid if the cases ever came to Court.28 
In several IQ-Net partner countries/regions, projects with social objectives have also 
become ensnared by State aid considerations. This appears to have become more 
commonplace with the growing appreciation of the breadth of undertaking. Examples 
cited include support for youth centres and elderly day care centres, charitable 
organisations selling second-hand goods and employing disabled people. The social 
objectives of these projects are clear; however, the extensive reach of the State aid 
definition has meant that active consideration has had to be given to whether or not aid is 
involved and, if so, whether it can be accommodated within either the GBER or de minimis 
provisions.  
Cutting across these issues, is the matter of what might be termed cross-sectoral projects  
those which comprise economic and non-economic elements. These typically arise in the 
context of projects with social objectives, as mentioned above, and cultural projects. 
Examples include museums that include a commercial element such as accommodation, 
retail or catering outlets or community facilities that are intended to serve local people, 
but include services for businesses. Projects of this type are not only more complicated to 
scrutinise for State aid purposes, but if State aid is present for one element but not another 
(for instance, because a local community facility can be deemed not to have any impact on 
trade) then support is considerably more complicated to administer: different intervention 
rates may apply to different parts of the project and different sets of accounts might need 
to be kept to verify that there is no cross-subsidisation. 
2.2 De minimis support 
Distinct from the Treaty provisions themselves in terms of aid definition and derogation 
from the general ban on State aid, the Commission has defined a level of aid below which 
Article 87(1) can be said not to apply  so-called de minimis aid. This arguably sits rather 
uneasily with the view of the Court of Justice,29 which historically has taken the view that 
even very small amounts of aid can have an impact on competition, but was driven by the 
need to reduce the administrative burden on the Commission and to focus resources on 
larger cases of aid.  
The de minimis principle has been enshrined in a Commission Regulation.30 This applies to 
aid to all sectors except agriculture and fisheries,31 coal, aid for the acquisition of vehicles 
by road transport undertakings, aid for export and aid for firms in difficulty. The essence of 
the de minimis rule is that aid of up to 200,000 per undertaking32 in any three-year period 
                                                 
28 BERR (2008) State Aid  UK Response to Procedural Questionnaire, URN 08/628, January 2008. 
29 See Bacon, K. (2009) European Community Law of State Aid, Oxford University Press, Oxford at 
para 2.146.  
30 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 
and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid OJEU 379/5 of 28 December 2006. 
31 Separate de minimis rules apply to these sectors.  
32 The ceiling is 100,000 in the transport sector; some activities are excluded altogether, notably 
agriculture and fisheries, export aid, rescue and restructuring aid and the acquisition of road freight 
transport vehicles. 
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can be considered to fall outside Article 87(1), provided that the criteria of the Regulation 
are met. 
Of particular importance, aid must be transparent. This means that it must be possible to 
calculate ex ante the gross grant-equivalent of aid without needing to undertake a risk 
assessment: loans may be regarded as transparent if the grant-equivalent is calculated on 
the basis of prevailing market interest rates; capital injections and risk capital measures 
are not considered transparent unless the capital provided is less than the de minimis 
ceiling. Aid provided under a guarantee scheme may be considered transparent if the 
underlying loan does not exceed 1.5 million per undertaking. Also important, de minimis 
aid cannot be cumulated with other State aid in respect of the same eligible costs. 
Nevertheless, the absence of restrictions on how de minimis aid is spent makes it a very 
flexible instrument. 
It is, however, important to note that in principle the facility carries with it quite stringent 
monitoring requirements. In particular: recipients must be explicitly informed that aid is 
being offered on the basis of the de minimis Regulation; Member States must obtain a 
declaration from recipients about any other de minimis aid received during the current and 
two previous fiscal years; and they must record all the information necessary to show that 
the Regulation has been complied with  these records must be maintained for 10 years. 
The Regulation makes reference to the establishment of a central register of de minimis aid 
containing complete information on all de minimis aid granted by any authority within the 
Member State, but there is no obligation to set up such a system. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of register of this type, it is difficult to imagine that compliance with the de 
minimis rule can be assured. In this situation, compliance depends essentially on the 
declaration by the undertaking about the amount of de minimis aid received in the relevant 
period.  
The notion of undertaking is not defined in the Regulation, and it is unclear what 
information is provided to beneficiaries by awarding bodies about the nature of the 
declaration  i.e. on whose behalf it is made. However, in the Dutch service stations case, 
the Commission took the view that:33 
the de minimis rule could only apply if each service station could be seen as a 
separate enterprise. A service station cannot be regarded as a separate enterprise 
if one owner possesses several service stations, which may be the case with 
company-owned/company operated service stations (Co/Co) or where the freedom 
of independent operators is circumscribed to such an extent by exclusive 
purchasing and rental agreements that they are controlled de facto by the large oil 
companies, as in the case of company-owned/dealer operated service stations. 
The implication of this decision is that in order to be certain of complying with the 
Regulation, Member States need to have a complete overview of all the beneficiaries of aid 
                                                 
33 Commission Decision of 20 July 1999 on the state aid implemented by the Netherlands for 633 
Dutch service stations located near the German border, OJEC No L 280/87 of 30 October 1999. 
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purporting to be de minimis, including ownership and other ties (such exclusive contracts) 
in order to establish that there is no cumulation in excess of the ceiling. An approach to 
addressing the cumulation problem has been put forward in the legal literature,34 but there 
is little evidence that the model guidelines proposed are reflected in current practice.  
Of crucial importance from a strictly legal perspective, aid is only considered de minimis if 
all the conditions of the Regulation are met; it is not sufficient that the amount of aid is 
transparent and below the ceiling  it is also necessary to comply with the monitoring 
requirements. Failure to do this means that the general prohibition in Article 87(1) and the 
notification requirement will apply; in other words, aid which is below the threshold, but 
does not meet all the criteria of the Regulation would, in principle, be treated as 
unnotified aid by the Commission. 
Nevertheless, reflecting the apparent flexibility of the mechanism, the de minimis facility 
has come to be widely used in many Member States, not least since de minimis aid can be 
employed to avoid a detailed consideration of whether a measure actually involves State 
aid at all. Indeed, many IQ-Net partners reported that they were encouraged to resort to 
the de minimis facility by the Commission for this very reason. Its use has been described 
variously as a safe harbour and a get out of jail free card. The de minimis categorisation 
is commonly viewed as a relatively straightforward way to ensure compliance  or, at least, 
the appearance of compliance. However, it is widely acknowledged that this may just be a 
veneer  that is to say, its use may in reality conceal a multitude of problems, particularly 
relating to the requirement to monitor the level of aids (from all State sources) being 
received by beneficiary firms over a three-year period.   
IQ-Net partner programmes take different approaches to monitoring the use of de minimis. 
The beneficiaries responsibilities are generally met by requiring the submission of some 
form of de minimis declaration, either providing information on any other de minimis aid 
already received, or declaring that they remain within the allowed threshold. The 
conditions surrounding de minimis are generally described to the applicant on several 
occasions e.g. in the commitment letter. However, few IQ-Net partners have formal 
arrangements in place to monitor applicants de minimis declarations closely, and they 
must rely on applicant honesty and understanding of the rules and conditions. Almost all 
recognise that it is impossible to check all other possible sources of funding which a 
beneficiary may have received. This uncertainty can be seen as a source of risk. For 
example, in Sachsen-Anhalt, de minimis projects are often selected for on-the-spot project 
checking visits because they are categorised as being of potentially higher risk, and, in fact, 
the MA advises against using de minimis due to the additional administrative burden and 
risk associated with it. In the United Kingdom, Regional Development Agencies and other 
awarding bodies are counselled to use de minimis only as a last option where it is not 
possible to provide cover for the funding under a block exemption scheme or an approved 
aid scheme;35 this partly reflects the administrative difficulties associated with de 
                                                 
34 Nicolaides, P. Kleis, M. and Kekelekis, M. (2008) Cumulation of de minimis aid to enterprises that 
form a single economic unit, European State Aid Law Quarterly, 1, pp48-54. 
35 OFFPAT (2007) Desk Instructions on Administrative Procedures when using de minimis Regulation, 
available at: http://www.offpat.info/publications.aspx  
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minimis, but also the perception that the threshold could become exhausted quite quickly. 
On the other hand, in Greece, audits carried out during the 2000-06 period revealed very 
few cases of aid exceeding de minimis limits. 
The use of formal monitoring procedures for overseeing the use of de minimis varies 
widely. A number have developed databases which attempt to capture the aid granted to 
individual beneficiaries to help monitor de minimis levels (for example, the SHRIMP (System 
for Collection, Reporting and Monitoring Aid) database in Poland and the BDA (Banca Dati 
Anagrafica) in Italy)36, while others either have concrete plans (e.g. the Czech Republic 
envisages a national database for all public support, including de minimis, to be operational 
from 2010) or are discussing this as a potential development. However, even where 
information systems are used to monitor Structural Funds aid, few Structural Funds 
management information systems have cross-over with national aid systems, meaning that a 
full picture of aid cumulated cannot be obtained. Some IQ-Net partners have concluded 
that de minimis support is too marginal for the purpose of setting up a separate database, 
or that it would be too costly to develop. 
Two interesting examples of databases which have been developed to capture de minimis 
levels can be found in Slovenia and Portugal, operating at Member State level. To monitor 
de minimis aid in Slovenia, the Slovenian State Aid Monitoring Department maintains a 
database allowing grantors to check whether potential recipients have already reached the 
ceiling. To allow the data on previously granted de minimis aids to be checked, the 
identification number of the recipient is entered resulting in a detailed overview of the aid 
according to individual recipient over the previous three-year period (see Figure 1 below).  
The database is considered by the SAMD to be a very good support tool, which has worked 
well since its introduction in 2001. 
                                                 
36 It should be noted, however, that the database is not as effective as was initially foreseen. The BDA 
was included in each NOP from 1989 (1989-93, 1994-99 and 2000-06) but the design of the database 
was too ambitious  i.e. the goal was to check all investments at single invoice level, to generate a 
national overview of all aids given out with public resources from national and sub-national 
authorities. There is now an attempt to simplify the BDA and concentrate it on de minimis. An 
interesting development is the linkage with the databases of the chambers of commerce (which 
manage the register of enterprises), so that all the information on a firm can be automatically 
obtained by inserting its VAT number. There should also be a link to the Ministry of Finances CUP  
Codice Unico di Progetto (a unique project code given to each project). 
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Figure 1: Slovenian State Aid Monitoring Department de minimis database 
Detailed overview of the aids according to 
individual potential recipient in the 
previous 3-year period: 
Overview of all granted de minimis aids by 
recipient in the previous 3- year period: 
 
 
Source: Slovenian State Aid Monitoring Department presentation (2008) 
In Portugal, support is only granted to projects falling within the de minimis rules when 
they have been checked through the national de minimis database, which was set up in 
2002. It was subsequently adapted in 2006 to conform to the new regulatory requirements, 
and then again in 2009 following the changes to the award limits in the context of the 
Commissions crisis measures. The IFDR is responsible for managing the database, which 
functions in a fully computerised form.  
The database functions in two stages. First of all, the body responsible for awarding the aid 
has to fill in a form covering a series of information fields: company name, tax number, 
validation of control of exceptions (e.g. if the company is in financial difficulty), code of 
economic activity, the amount of aid and the date of the award decision. This information 
is transmitted via the internet to the database. The database produces a first report to 
detect errors or inconsistencies in the entries. The second stage involves a verification 
check on whether the award complies with the eligible thresholds (in terms of the volume 
and cumulation of aid). Within 3-5 days, an electronic report is automatically produced and 
sent to the body that is responsible for awarding the aid, verifying whether the aid can be 
granted. A manual has been prepared to support the aid awarding bodies in inputting data 
to the system. 
The Portuguese system is considered to have three key strengths.  First it automates the de 
minimis rules into the decision-making process. Second, it provides for greater legal 
certainty in awarding support. Lastly, is provides a speedy and reliable mechanism for 
identifying the de minimis support granted to a recipient. 
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3. THE SCOPE OF ADMISSIBLE AID 
There is a presumption under Article 87(1) that measures fulfilling the criteria (benefit, 
State and State resources, selectivity, distortion of competition and impact on intra-EU 
trade) are prohibited. The wide interpretation of these criteria means that the reach of 
State aid control into economic development activities is extensive. However, the basic 
prohibition of State aids is tempered by a number of derogations which define the 
circumstances in which State aid is, or may be, compatible with the Treaty. This section 
focuses on the circumstances in which State may be admissible.37 It begins by outlining the 
Treaty provisions derogating from the basic prohibition (see 3.1) and goes on to discuss the 
substance of derogation in a number of keys areas of relevance to the operation of the 
Structural Funds (see 3.2). 
3.1 Treaty provisions 
Article 87(1) gives the initial impression of a draconian approach to subsidies because the 
prohibition is apparently cast so wide. However, Articles 87(2) and (3) set out a number of 
exceptions to the general ban. Article 87(2) is of relatively limited application (and offers 
little discretion to the Commission), but Article 87(3) has been extensively interpreted by 
the Commission to provide a basis for finding measures targeting a wide range of policy 
objectives compatible.  
3.1.1 Mandatory exceptions to the general ban 
Article 87(2) provides that the following shall be compatible with the common market: 
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such 
aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences; 
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany 
affected by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to 
compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division. 
Measures that address these objectives must be notified to the European Commission in 
advance of implementation, but the Commission does not have the discretion to decide 
whether or not to authorise them, rather it must determine whether the conditions set out 
above are met. Article 87(2) is not of major importance for Structural Funds programmes 
since the types of measure for which it provides are unlikely to fall within the scope of EU 
Cohesion policy. Nevertheless, it is worth noting in passing that this provision has been 
used, for example, to authorise passenger travel grants for internal flights in Guyane 
(Article 87(2)(a))38 and reconstruction loans following flooding in Hungary (Article 
                                                 
37 The focus of this is on the general Treaty provisions in relation to State aid, rather than the specific 
sectoral provisions eg in relation to transport and agriculture.  
38 Commission Decision N 912/2006  France : Régime daides à caractère social sur certaines liaisons 
aériennes intérieures en Guyane, 19 March 2007. 
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87(2)(b)).39 On the other hand, following German reunification, Article 87(2)(c) has fallen 
into disuse.  
3.1.2 Discret ionary exceptions to the general ban 
Under Article 87(3), the following may be considered to be compatible with the common 
market: 
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest 
or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an 
extent contrary to the common interest; 
(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect 
trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to 
the common interest; 
(e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council acting 
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.  
These provisions have been extensively interpreted by the European Commission, giving rise 
to a large body of guidelines, communications and regulations specifying policy across a 
range of areas. 
Article 87(3)(a) provides the legal basis for State aid to the most disadvantaged regions of 
the Community. These so-called a regions are defined on the same basis as the 
Convergence regions under EU Cohesion policy  i.e. GDP (PPS) per head of less 75 percent 
of the EU average  and for the same period (2007-2013). Regional aid is discussed in more 
detail below (see 3.2.1). 
Article 87(3)(b) enables two types of support to be authorized: aid for projects of common 
European interest  such as aid for the Channel tunnel rail link;40 and aid to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. Until 2008, this latter provision was 
scarcely used; however, the global financial crisis has resulted in a raft of measures being 
approved on the basis of Article 87(3)(b). It was used as the basis for authorising support for 
individual financial institutions (the Commissions standard approach to rescue and 
restructuring aid proving inadequate in the circumstances). In addition, and potentially 
more relevant in the present context, Article 87(3)(b) is the basis for the temporary 
framework which enables the Commission to authorise aid for the real economy (see 3.2.5 
below). 
                                                 
39 Commission Decision N463a/2006 - Hungary: Reconstruction loan to make good the damage caused 
by the flood 2006, 11 December 2006.  
40 Commission Decision N 706/2001  United Kingdom: The Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 24 April 2002.  
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Article 87(3)(c) underpins the widest range of exceptions and is the legal basis of most 
relevance for State aid under the Structural Fund programmes. The general principle of this 
provision is that aid may be allowed for the development of certain activities and regions, 
but it should be limited in order to ensure that the common interest requirement is met. 
Under Article 87(3)(c), the Commission has developed a basis for authorising aid for a 
number of objectives, including regional development, support for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), R&D, innovation and environmental protection. The terms on which 
such aid may be offered are set out in various guidelines and communications and, 
importantly, the General Block Exemption Regulation discussed further below (see 4.1.1).  
Article 87(3)(d) was added to the EC Treaty by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. It has been 
used as the basis for authorising aid to the film industry,41 as well as schemes for theatre 
and dance activities,42 and museums.43 In some cases, it is clearly debatable whether 
indeed the support involves aid at all, but the Commission is characteristically ambivalent 
about ruling out such possibilities, preferring to raise no objections to the measures 
concerned by authorising them under Article 87(3)(d). However, the resource intensity of 
case-by-case scrutiny has led some to call for a block exemption regulation in this area.44 
For the time being, however, there are no general guidelines on how the Commission will 
address aid to culture and national heritage, although specific communications do apply to 
the film industry45 and public service broadcasting.46 
For completeness, it can be noted that the use of Article 87(3)(e)  authorisation of state 
aid by the Council - is extremely rare and unlikely to arise in the day-to-day operations of 
the Structural Funds. 
3.2 Admissible aid  some key policy areas 
The interpretation of the derogations from the general ban on State aid has given rise to a 
vast body of soft, and, increasingly, hard law. In their current form, these rules run to over 
500 pages,47 without including matters of interpretation that necessarily arise from 
individual decisions. Many of these rules have been significantly recast in the wake of the 
                                                 
41 Commission Decision N 760/2007  France : Modification du dispositif du crédit d'impôt en faveur 
de la production Phonographique, 16 July 2008.  
42 Commission Decision N 368/2008- Spain: Aid for theatre, dance, music and audiovisual activities in 
the Basque country, 22 August 2008.  
43 Commission Decision N 293/2008  Hungary: Aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, 
museums, public Libraries, 26 November 2008. 
44 Sinnaeve, A. (2008) Does Aid for Theatres Affect Trade between Member States? European State 
Aid Law Quarterly, 1, pp7-11. 
45 Communication from the Commission concerning the State aid assessment criteria of the 
Commission communication on certain legal aspects relating to cinematographic and other 
audiovisual works (Cinema Communication) of 26 September 2001, OJEU No C 31/1 of 7 February 
2009. 
46 Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to public service 
broadcasting, OJEC No C320/5 of 15 November 2001. 
47 See European Commission (2008) EU Competition Law  Rules Applicable to State Aid, situation at 1 
November 2008, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/compilation/index_en.html  
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State aid action plan (SAAP),48 which was itself set in the context of the Lisbon strategy for 
growth and jobs. In essence, the rules aim to embody the balancing of the positive effects 
of State aid (in terms of contributing to the achievement of objectives of common interest) 
against its negative impacts (distortion of competition and trade); in principle, for State aid 
to be compatible, it must be necessary and proportionate.  
The substantive rules relating to the assessment and compatibility of State aid cover a wide 
range of areas, from those that are generally viewed positively (such as support for SMEs) to 
those where considerable caution is exercised (support for rescue and restructuring). In 
between, the Commissions treatment of investment and employment aid to large firms is 
more nuanced and driven by its perception of regional problems  in prosperous regions 
such aid will be disallowed, but in disadvantaged regions quite high levels of aid may be 
authorised.  
The aim of the remainder of this section is to provide a brief overview of the main 
substantive rules of relevance to Structural Funds programmes, focusing on those 
highlighted by the IQ-Net partners as presenting particular issues or difficulties. The 
emphasis here is on the content of the rules, rather than the form  i.e. guidelines and 
General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), which is discussed in Section 4 below. 
3.2.1 Regional aid 
Regional aid was the first policy area in which the Commission formalised its position, with 
some key principles set out as far back as the 1970s. Over time, the approach has become 
more comprehensive and predictable, and the timescale of the regional aid rules has been 
explicitly aligned with the planning period for the Structural Funds.  
Regional aid is designed to promote the economic development of areas defined on the 
basis of Article 87(3)(a) and (c) (a regions and c areas). This effectively restricts the use 
of investment aid to large firms to those located in designated areas; it also determines the 
areas in which SMEs may benefit from higher rates of award.  
Under the current guidelines,49 the regional aid maps were defined for the period 2007-
2013, with limited scope for review. Eligible areas cover just under half of the EU 
population: a regions were defined on the basis of EU-wide criteria (essentially GDP per 
head) while c areas were selected by the Member States.  
The guidelines envisage the following types of support: 
x Investment aid 
x Aid for employment linked to initial investment 
x Aid for newly created small enterprises 
                                                 
48 European Commission (2005) State Aid Action Plan  Less and better targeted state aid: a roadmap 
for state aid reform, COM(2005)107 final, Brussels, 7 June 2005. 
49 Guidelines on Regional Aid for 2007-2013, OJEU No C54/13 of 4 March 2006. 
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x Operating aid (exceptionally  mainly in outermost or sparsely-populated regions). 
In practice, the Regional Block Exemption Regulation50 and the GBER51 which superseded it 
mean that most regional aid schemes can be implemented without prior notification to the 
Commission  the principal exception concerns operating aid, which must always be 
notified.52 
Maximum rates of award under the Guidelines are calibrated by firm size and the severity 
of the regional problem. The main provisions for maximum rates are set out in Figure 2.53  
Figure 2: Award maxima under the Regional Aid Guidelines 
 Large firms Medium-firms Small firms 
a regions GDP per head 
<45% EU25 average 
50% 60% 70% 
a regions GDP per head 
<60% EU25 average 
40% 50% 60% 
a regions GDP per head 
<75% EU25 average 
30% 40% 50% 
c areas (general case) 15% 25% 35% 
 
In general, eligible investment is limited to new assets (except SMEs), the retention of the 
investment in the assisted area for at least five years (three years for SMEs) and a financial 
contribution of 25 percent from the beneficiary. Where support is for employment linked to 
initial investment, the same aid rate applies to the additional wage costs related to the 
new jobs. 
For some of the IQ-Net partner countries/regions the Regional Aid Guidelines provide 
considerable flexibility. In Poland and Slovenia, for example, the entire country is covered 
by a region status, as is most of the Czech Republic and Greece. This means that 
throughout all or most of these territories, investment aid can be offered to large firms as 
well as SMEs and at relatively high levels of aid intensity. 
Elsewhere, coverage is much more fragmented and, importantly, in many regions is 
significantly lower than in the previous planning period. This has several side effects. Some 
IQ-Net partners pointed to the complexities of having different rates of award within the 
region, depending on the prevailing assisted area status. Others noted that regional aid 
areas do not necessarily coincide with urban regeneration areas, limiting the scope for 
intervention to support such projects where there is no overlap. A further point is that the 
loss of assisted area status has not only meant that SMEs must be assisted at a lower rate 
than before, but also that large firms can only be assisted under horizontal regimes, such as 
                                                 
50 Commission Regulation (EC) no 1628/2006 on the application of Article 87 and 88 of the Treaty to 
national regional investment aid, OJEU No L302/29 of 1 November 2006. 
51 Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 august 2008 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the common market in application of Article 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block 
exemption Regulation), OJEU No L 214/3 of 9 August 2008. 
52 Certain large cases also require individual clearance. 
53 In reality, the matrix is much more detailed and includes transitional arrangements for some 
regions and special provisions for others such as outermost and border regions.  
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R&D&I. Clearly these have a much narrower focus (as well as modest rates of award) 
resulting in more limited possibilities for intervention. A more general observation was the 
lack of flexibility in area designation in the context of the recession. France sought, 
unsuccessfully, an extension of the assisted areas map in the context of the current 
economic crisis and the closures taking place in non-assisted and several IQ-Net partners 
bemoaned the largesse of the Commission towards the financial services sector when set 
against its strict approach to regional aid. 
3.2.2 SME aid 
The approach to State aid for SMEs under Competition policy is generally positive, 
reflecting the political will of the Commission to recognise the central role of SMEs in the 
EU economy.54 The definition of an SME is set out in the Annex to the GBER and is 
essentially as follows: 
A medium-sized enterprise is one that has: 
x fewer than 250 employees and 
x either an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million and/or a balance sheet total not 
exceeding 43 million. 
A small enterprise is one that has: 
x fewer than 50 employees and 
x either an annual turnover and/or balance sheet total not exceeding 10 million. 
These criteria must be applied to the enterprise as a whole, including subsidiaries in other 
countries. The Regulation also provides definitions of autonomous, linked and partner 
enterprises with a view to assessing the real economic position of the organisation 
concerned.  
There are a number of SME-specific aid categories identified in the GBER as compatible 
with the Treaty. These are: 
x investment and employment aid  permissible in all regions, with higher rates 
applicable in designated a regions and c areas55 
x aid for newly-created small enterprises established by female entrepreneurs56 
x aid for early adoption of future Community environmental standards57 
                                                 
54 European Commission (2008) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Think 
Small First, A Small Business Act for Europe, COM(2008)394 final, 25 June 2008. 
55 GBER, Articles 13 and 15. 
56 GBER, article 16. 
57 GBER, Article 20. 
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x aid for consultancy58 
x aid for participation in trade fairs59 
x aid in the form of risk capital60 
x aid for obtaining and validating patents and other IP rights61 
x aid to young innovative enterprises62 
x aid for innovation advisory and support services.63 
Eligible expenditure varies by category of aid, as do maximum rates of award, which are set 
out in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Maximum rates of award for SME aid 
Investment and employment aid 
(higher rates apply to processing 
and marketing of agricultural 
products and in regional aid 
areas) 
 
x Small firms 
x Medium firms 
 
20% 
10% 
Female entrepreneurship  15% 
Early adaptation to future 
Community standards 
x Small firms 
x Medium firms 
15% 
10% 
Risk capital  Maximum investment 1.5 
mill per target undertaking 
Consultancy services and 
participation in trade fairs 
  
50% 
Intellectual property rights x Fundamental 
research 
x Industrial research 
x Experimental 
development 
 
100% 
50% 
25% 
Innovation advisory and support 
services 
 Generally 75% 
 
In general, SME aid is widely used under the Structural Funds programmes  especially 
investment and employment aid which, in some countries (e.g. France), have been 
incorporated into umbrella schemes enabling all tiers of government to offer aid. It remains 
to be seen what advantage will be taken of the newer forms of aid enumerated under the 
GBER. Nevertheless, it appears that SME aid is being operated with few compliance or 
compatibility issues among the IQ-Net partners, although attention was drawn to the 
complexities of applying the concept of linked enterprises and the resource implications of 
                                                 
58 GBER, Article 26. 
59 GBER, Article 27. 
60 GBER, Article 29. 
61 GBER, Article 33. 
62 GBER, Article 35 
63 GBER, Article 36. 
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applying the size criteria, an aspect which has also received some attention in the legal 
literature.64 
3.2.3 Research, development and innovation (R&D&I) 
In principle, research, development and innovation (R&D&I) is also a policy area in which 
the Commission perceives there to be clear benefits from public intervention. Indeed, the 
2002 Barcelona European Council agreed that R&D spending should be increased, with a 
target of 3 percent of GDP by 2010 and two-thirds of new investment to come from the 
private sector. This positive attitude to supporting R&D is reflected in the framework on 
State aid for R&D and innovation65, which identified a range of aid measures as potentially 
compatible with the Treaty, notably aid for: 
x R&D projects 
x technical feasibility studies 
x young innovative firms 
x process and organisational innovation in SMEs 
x loan of highly qualified personnel 
x innovation clusters. 
Schemes supporting most of these66 may be reported under the GBER, subject to certain 
size limits, beyond which they are subject to assessment under the R&D&I Framework. 
The level of support for R&D projects varies according to the stage of the research with up 
to 100 percent of fundamental research costs being eligible, but support for experimental 
development generally being limited to 25 percent of eligible costs for large firms, rising to 
45 percent for small firms. 
The different phases of the research process with respect to research projects, in 
particular, are defined as follows: 
x fundamental research means experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to 
acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable 
facts, without any direct practical application or use in view; 
x industrial research means planned research or critical investigation aimed at the 
acquisition of new knowledge and skills for developing new products, processes or 
services or for brining about a significant improvement of the same; 
                                                 
64 See Kekelekis, M. (2008) The big enterprise of defining SMEs in State aid cases, European State 
Aid Law Quarterly, 2008(1) pp 12-27. 
65 Community framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJEC No 
C323/1 of 30 December 2006.  
66 Schemes for process and organisational innovation and innovation clusters are excluded. 
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x experimental development means the acquisition, combination, shaping and use of 
existing scientific, technological, business and other relevant knowledge and skills to 
produce plans and arrangements for new or improved products, processes and services. 
Notwithstanding the apparently positive attitude to State aid for R&D&I under the 
framework, the State aid rules were cited by several IQ-Net partners as a major constraint 
in supporting R&D under the Structural Funds programmes. At the same time, as noted 
earlier, the reliance on R&D&I type support has grown in many regions with the decline in 
the availability of investment aid, following the redrawing (and shrinkage) of the assisted 
area maps. In some countries, the limitations imposed by the State aid rules appear to arise 
at least in part from the large role played by the State in research activity; this can reduce 
the room for manoeuvre in, for example, the promotion of collaborative projects. 
Elsewhere, the State aid rules were viewed as a constraint on the commercialisation of the 
R&D activities of universities. This issue has been addressed explicitly in the United 
Kingdom with a guidance note for universities and research organisations aimed at setting 
out the circumstances in which such bodies are not operating as undertakings (and 
therefore support is provided on a no aid basis), how such organisations can avoid giving 
aid to third parties and, where there is aid, on what basis it can be rendered compliant 
with the State aid rules.67 
A number of IQ-Net partners mentioned that funding clusters was a particular problem and 
were critical of the lack of coordination between DG Regio and DG Comp on this subject. In 
practice, there appear to have been few instances of funding for clusters notified.68 
Another difficulty cited by the IQ-Net partners was the interpretation of the different 
phases of the R&D process and knowing to which phase a given project should be allocated 
(and the funding of projects which cut across the phases defined).  
More generally, there was a perception that the State aid rules made the Lisbon 
objectives more difficult to address, notably because of the emphasis on funding research 
projects rather than research infrastructure. Clearly there is scope to fund research 
infrastructure outside of the scope of the State aid rules. For example, in considering 
support for the Fraunhofer Centre for Silicone Photovoltaics (which the German authorities 
had notified for legal certainty) the Commission concluded that no State aid was involved.69 
In part, this was because its activities were largely non-economic as defined in the 
guidelines (namely education, the conduct of independent R&D for more knowledge and the 
dissemination of research results); in addition, with regard to economic activities (such as 
carrying out research on behalf of undertakings), the costing of those activities was subject 
to guidelines the purpose of which was to avoid any advantage of public sector contracting 
bodies over private ones and the spill-over of funding from non-economic to economic 
activities. Moreover, separate accounts were to be maintained for economic activities. 
                                                 
67 BERR (2008) Universities and Research Organisations on the EC State Aid Framework for R&D&I  
Guidance Note, URN 08/1501 December 2008. 
68 Commission Decision N331/2007  Germany (Thuringia): Guideline for the promotion of innovative 
technology oriented collaboration projects, networks and clusters, 28 January 2008. 
69 Commission Decision N365/2007  Germany (Sachsen-Anhalt): Establishment of Fraunhofer Centre 
for Silicon Photovoltaics, 26 November 2008. 
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A number of IQ-Net partners commented on the complexities involved in constructing such 
arrangements and assembling aid packages that were State aid compliant. They argued that 
projects could be compromised or even abandoned either because of those difficulties, or 
because the aid intensities were too low (or eligible expenditure too narrowly defined) for 
projects to be sustainable. 
At a more conceptual level, but with practical implications, the R&D&I State aid framework 
has been criticised in work undertaken for the French Ministry for Industry which concluded 
that the market failure doctrine is a very inadequate framework within which to judge 
the case for State aid for R&D.70 A related study71 made a number of recommendations, 
including that: the rules for schemes subject to the standard assessment procedure should 
be made simpler; the rate of award for clusters should be raised; the definition of process 
and organisational innovation in services should be widened; and the size limit on firms 
eligible for the SME bonus should be increased. 
3.2.4 Risk capital 
Since 2001, the Commission has operated guidelines that set out the circumstances in which 
support for risk capital measures involves State aid and the conditions under which it might 
be deemed compatible with the Treaty; the current guidelines72 date back to 2006, and 
some support mechanisms are be covered by the GBER.73 
Under the GBER, risk capital measures in the form of participation in a private equity 
investment fund are compatible with the Treaty if the following conditions are met: 
x the tranches of investment made by the fund in any target SME do not exceed 1.5 
million in any 12 month period; 
x at least 70 percent of the fund is invested in SMEs in the form of equity or quasi 
equity; 
x for SMEs in assisted areas and small firms, risk capital is restricted to providing seed 
capital, start-up and/or expansion capital. For medium-firms in non-assisted areas 
expansion capital is excluded; 
x at least 50 percent of the financing of the fund is provided by private investors 
(except where the fund exclusively targets SMEs in assisted areas, in which case the 
threshold is 30 percent); 
                                                 
70 Metcalfe, S (2008) The Perpetual Dance: Competition, Innovation and the Community Framework 
for State Aid for R&D&I, étude réalisée sous la supervision de Technopolis Group France à la demande 
de la Direction générale des Entreprises du ministère de lEconomie, de lIndustrie et de lEmploi, 
June 2008. 
71 Technopolis (2008) Impact of the Community Framework for State Aid for Research and 
Development and Innovation on European Union Competitiveness, Summary of study undertaken at 
the request of the Directorate General of Enterprises, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Industry and 
Employment, June 2008. 
72 Community guidelines on State aid to promote risk capital investment in small and medium-sized 
enterprises, OJEU No C 194/2 of 18 August 2006. 
73 Note also that the temporary framework for the economic crisis provides for a relaxation of some of 
these conditions until end 2010  see 3.2.5 below. 
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x the risk capital measure must be profit driven (there must be a business plan for 
each investment and a clear and realistic exit strategy); 
x the investment fund must be managed on a commercial basis. 
Where measures do not comply with the GBER, they may nevertheless be approved after 
scrutiny under the Risk Capital Guidelines. For these purposes, the Commission will 
consider whether State aid is present at each of the following tiers: 
x the investor: the Commission will consider the investment to be effected pari passu 
between public and private investors, and thus not to constitute State aid, where 
its terms would be acceptable to a normal economic operator in a market economy 
without State intervention. This is assumed to be the case only if public and private 
investors share exactly the same upside and downside risks and rewards and hold 
the same level of subordination, and normally where at least 50 percent of the 
funding of the measure is provided by private investors, which are independent 
from the companies in which they invest.  
x the investment fund, vehicle or manager: in general, this tier is considered to be 
the intermediary vehicle for the transfer of investment to the SME, rather than a 
beneficiary. However, aid may be involved if, for example, the remuneration of the 
management company is out of line with current market trends.  
x the enterprises in which investment is made: if aid is present at the level of the 
investor or the fund, there is normally a presumption that it is also at least partially 
passed on to the target enterprise, unless the investment complies with the market 
investor principle.  
Some risk capital measures involving State aid will be subject to a standard assessment 
under the Guidelines  these will be handled under the simplified procedure under the new 
procedural package (see discussion in 4.1.3 below). Others will be subject to a more 
detailed balancing test in which the Commission seeks to set the positive effects of aid 
(expressed in terms of the presence of a market failure, the appropriateness of the 
instrument, the incentive effect and necessity of aid and proportionality) against its 
negative effects (crowding out and other distortions of competition). 
Overall, the Guidelines and the GBER combined set out a complex series of criteria for 
determining first, whether State aid is present and second, if so, whether it (i) can be 
reported under the GBER, or (ii) is subject to a simplified assessment, or (iii) is subject to 
more detailed scrutiny. Clearly, there is scope is to operate risk capital measures in ways 
that fall outside the State aid rules completely, and this line is followed is some IQ-Net 
partner countries/regions. In others, however, the very nature of participation funds and 
the share of public funds within them make it impossible to demonstrate that operations 
are effected on a pari passu basis. In any event, the very purpose of such funds is to bridge 
what is perceived to be a gap in private sector provision and there would seem to be no 
public policy benefit in simply replicating what is delivered by the market. 
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Many IQ-Net partners expressed concern at the complexity of the requirements under the 
risk capital guidelines. This applies to both purely domestic arrangements and to those 
involving EU financial engineering instruments such as JEREMIE and JESSICA. Indeed, one IQ-
Net partner cited the relationship between JEREMIE and the State aid rules as being 
symptomatic of a serious dysfunction in the Commission, while another noted that 
coordination between DG Regio and DG Comp had been particularly poor with respect to 
financial engineering. To date, two JEREMIE-based measures have been approved under the 
State aid rules  in Hungary and Wales (United Kingdom).74 The implementation of JESSICA 
is still under discussion in many regions / countries, with consideration being given, for 
example, to using the participation the EIB in order to avoid procurement and State aid 
issues. It is worth noting in passing that some IQ-Net partners criticised the privileged role 
of the EIB in this context. 
More generally, there is, at best, a discontinuity between DG Regios exhortations to 
Member States to make greater use of financial engineering instruments and DG Comps 
capacity to scrutinise and approve them swiftly. On the other hand, there is also 
considerable evidence that, in spite of COCOF guidance,75 difficulties in implementing 
financial engineering instruments go well beyond State aid issues and that many managing 
authorities lack the technical capacity to establish the relevant mechanisms within the 
current legal framework.76 
3.2.5 Temporary measures in response to the economic crisis 
In December 2008, the Commission adopted a temporary framework for State aid measures 
to support access to finance in the financial and economic crisis. 77 The measures are based 
on Article 87(3)(b), which enables the Commission to authorise measures to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. Reflecting this, some subnational 
governments (such as Scotland and Vlaanderen) had proposals for such measures turned 
down on the basis that the conditions in the economy of the Member State constituted 
the underlying justification for any authorisation  although clearly there are also 
administrative benefits to the Commission in terms of the potential number of 
notifications. 
The framework has two main objectives: (i) to allow measures that unblock bank lending to 
firms and thereby guarantee continuity in access to finance; and (ii) to facilitate aid 
schemes that encourage continued investment, especially in sustainable growth. Proposed 
measures must be notified and approved by the Commission prior to implementation, but 
                                                 
74 Commission Decision N355/2008  Hungary: Hungarian JEREMIE risk capital measure, 10 December 
2008; and Commission Decision N700/2007  United Kingdom, Wales: Finance Wales JEREMIE Fund, 14 
November 2008. 
75 Note of the Commission Services on financial Engineering in the 2007-13 programming period, DOC 
COCOF/07/0018/01-EN final of 16 July 2007; and, Guidance Note on Financial Engineering, COCOF 
08/0002/03-EN of 22 December 2008.  
76 Matusiak, A. (2009) European Network on Financial Instruments, Marshal Office of the Wielkopolska 
Region. 
77 The consolidated version including the February 2009 amendments is Temporary Community 
framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic 
crisis, OJEU No C 83/1 of 7 April 2009.  
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thereafter individual aid within the terms of the approved scheme can be offered 
immediately and without further notification. 
Under the framework, a number of conditions apply: 
x all measures apply only to firms which were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008; they may 
apply to firms which entered into difficulties thereafter as a consequence of the 
economic and financial crisis; 
x all measures are applicable to 31 December 2010; 
x approved temporary measures may not be cumulated with de minimis aid in respect of 
the same eligible expenditure; 
x approved temporary measures may be cumulated with other compatible aid or with 
other forms of Community financing, provided that the maximum aid intensities in the 
relevant guidelines or GBER are respected. 
The temporary framework comprises both new instruments and the (temporary) 
modification of existing instruments. The key forms of aid which can be authorised under 
the framework are as follows. 
x A lump sum of up to 500,000 per undertaking. In calculating this sum, account must 
be taken of any aid paid under the de minimis Regulation. 
x State guarantees for loans at a reduced premium. The reduction is up to 25 percent for 
SMEs and 15% for large firms on the annual premium calculated in accordance with the 
safe harbour provisions annexed to the Framework or a methodology already accepted 
by the Commission.78 The loan must not exceed the wage bill of the firm, and the 
guarantee may not exceed 90 percent of the loan. 
x Subsidised interest rates. The rate which the Commission will accept is linked to the 
central bank overnight rate, the interbank rate and a risk premium related to the credit 
worthiness of the firm. More generous terms may be authorised for the production of 
green products 
In addition to these essentially new measures, the Framework also provides for a temporary 
derogation from the risk capital guidelines (see 3.2.4 above) in respect of the size of 
investment per target enterprise (raised from 1.5 million to 2.5 million) and the 
proportion of private participation (lowered from 50 percent to 30 percent). 
Since the introduction of the Framework a large number of measures has been approved by 
the Commission. These are summarised in Figure 4. 
                                                 
78 Notably in the context of the GBER, where approval of calculation methodologies may render 
otherwise intransparent aid transparent. 
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Figure 4: Measures approved under the Temporary Framework for the real economy 
 Type of measure / Beneficiary Date of adoption 
Austria N47/a/2009 - Temporary scheme (aid up to  500 000) 20 March 2009 
Austria N47/d/2009 - Temporary scheme (risk capital) 25 March 2009 
Belgium N117/2009 - Temporary scheme (subsidised guarantees) 20 March 2009 
Czech Rep N236/2009 - Temporary scheme (aid up to  500 000) 7 May 2009 
Czech Rep N237/2009  Temporary scheme (subsidised interest 
rates) 
6 May 2009 
Denmark N198/2009  Temporary scheme (export credit 
insurance) 
6 May 2009 
France N7/2009 - Temporary scheme (aid up to  500 000) 19 January 2009 
France N15/2009 - Temporary scheme (reduced interest rates) 4 February 2009 
France N11/2009 - Temporary scheme (reduced interest rates  
to producers of green products) 
3 February 2009 
France N23/2009 - Temporary scheme (subsidised guarantees) 27 February 2009 
France N119/2009 - Modification of French risk capital scheme 16 March 2009 
Germany N661/2008  KfW run special program 2009 (interest 
subsidies) 
30 December 2008 
Germany N668/2008  Temporary scheme (limited amount of 
compatible aid) 
30 December 2008 
Germany N39/2009  Temporary adaptation of risk-capital 
schemes 
3 February 2009 
Germany N27/2009 - Temporary scheme (guarantees) 27 February 2009 
Germany N38/2009 - Temporary scheme (reduced interest rates) 19 February 2009 
Hungary N203/2009 - Temporary scheme (guarantees) 27 April 2009 
Hungary  N114/2009 - Temporary scheme (guarantees) 10 March 2009 
Hungary N77/2009 - Temporary scheme (aid up to  500 000) 24 February 2009 
Hungary N78/2009  Temporary scheme (subsidised interest 
rates) 
24 February 2009 
Ireland N186/2009  Temporary scheme (aid up to  500 000) 15 April 2009 
Latvia N124/2009  Temporary scheme (aid up to  500 000) 19 March 2009 
Latvia N139/2009 - Temporary scheme (subsidised guarantees) 23 April 2009 
Luxembourg N99/2009  Temporary scheme (aid up to  500 000) 26 February 2009 
Luxembourg N128/2009  Temporary scheme (guarantees) 11 March 2009 
Luxembourg N50/2009  Temporary scheme (export-credit insurance) 20 April 2009 
Netherlands N156/2009  Temporary scheme (aid up to 500000) 1 April 2009 
Portugal N13/2009  Temporary scheme (aid up to 500,000) 19 January 2009 
Slovakia N222/2009 - Temporary scheme (aid up to 500,000) 30 April 2009 
Spain N140/2009  Temporary scheme (aid for green cars) 29 March 2009 
UK N43/2009  Temporary scheme (aid up to 500,000) 4 February 2009 
UK N71/2009  Temporary scheme (guarantees) 27 February 2009 
UK N72/2009  Temporary scheme (to businesses producing 
green products) 
27 February 2009 
UK N257/2009  Temporary scheme (subsidised interest 
rates) 
15 May 2009 
Source: DG Comp website, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/news.html 
It remains to be seen precisely what impact this new facility will have on the Structural 
Funds programmes. At first sight, however, it would appear that its effects are likely to be 
limited. This is partly because of the way in which intervention is programmed to take 
place over a relatively long period, rather than responding to cyclical change in the 
economy; Managing Authorities may not wish to, or may not be in a position to, adapt 
programmes to accommodate a facility that lasts only until the end of 2010. The reactions 
of the IQ-Net Managing Authorities to the package were mixed, but on balance not 
especially positive. Several pointed to the complexity of the measures approved  one 
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regional authority noting that it had engaged a firm of lawyers to assist with the 
interpretation of the provisions relating to soft loans and guarantees. Another respondent 
observed that the equity and soft loan funding, in particular, would be of limited value to 
SMEs since, in addition to the complexity of the measures, the advantageous rates of 
intervention were only temporary, and small firms would find it hard to deal with a sudden 
reduction in equity funding. On the other hand, what has been widely characterised as an 
extension of the de minimis facility to 500,000, has been viewed more positively as 
increasing flexibility. It is important to note, however, that this is a misinterpretation of 
the new measure (it does not fall outside Article 87(1)) and that longer term the monitoring 
requirements associated with cumulation of temporary measures with de minimis support 
may prove cumbersome to manage.  
4. MANAGING COMPLIANCE 
The compliance of the Structural Funds with the State aid rules is driven by two separate, 
but interrelated strands of obligation imposed on domestic authorities: those relating to the 
implementation of the Structural Funds Regulation and those flowing from the requirements 
of the Treaty in respect of Competition policy. 
The Structural Funds Regulation imposes a general duty on the Commission and the Member 
States to ensure that assistance from the Funds is consistent with the activities, policies 
and priorities of the Community.79 This obligation is cascaded down into explicit 
commitments in the National Strategic Reference Frameworks and Operational Programmes 
to comply with EU State aid rules. Moreover, from a procedural perspective, the 
implementing Regulation requires Member States to indicate the guidance provided on 
State aid issues and the checks in place to ensure compliance at the level of each Managing 
Authority (in their descriptions of the management and control systems).80 
These provisions are additional to the more general obligation on Member States regarding 
respect for competition policy. Moreover, although the Managing Authorities have a 
particular role in the context of the Structural Funds, ultimate responsibility rests with the 
Member State, which is the addressee of any formal communication from the Commission, 
including the initiation of investigative proceedings and their outcome. Failure to comply 
with the State aid rules  or at least being caught failing to so  may be a source of acute 
political embarrassment, but there are also consequences for the beneficiary of illegal and 
incompatible aid since such aid may have to be repaid, with interest.  
This architecture means that there is a range of actors with a vested interest in State aid 
compliance  the European Commission (DG Comp, in particular, but also DG Regio and, in 
some cases DG Tren), national governments (as formal addressees of decisions), Managing 
Authorities (with formal responsibility under the Structural Funds Regulation) and 
                                                 
79 Article 9, Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on 
the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, OJEU No L 210/25 of 31 July 2006.  
80 Article 21 and related Annex XII of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006 of 8 December, OJEU 
No L 371/1 of 27 December 2006.  
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beneficiaries (who may have to reimburse aid). Beyond this, there is a large number of 
intermediaries involved in actually or potentially providing aid co-financed by the Structural 
Funds, whose policy is shaped by the State aid rules and whose policy objectives may be 
frustrated by them. Last, but by no means least, in many jurisdictions, there are specialised 
State aid units, fulfilling an important guidance, advisory and training role, although rarely 
a statutory function.  
Against this background, this section begins by setting out the key features of the EU 
framework for ensuring compliance with the State aid rules (see 4.1), before going to 
review the domestic arrangements for compliance in the IQ-Net partner jurisdictions (see 
4.2). 
4.1 The EU Framework 
In principle (under the Treaty), any plans to offer aid must be notified to the Commission in 
advance and approved prior to implementation by the awarding authority. In other words, 
both the decision about whether a measure involves State aid and, if so, whether it is 
compatible with the Treaty formally rest with the Commission. Of course, the decision 
about whether a measure requires notification at all lies essentially with the domestic 
authorities, requiring, in principle, an appraisal of State aid issues prior to 
implementation.81 As Section 2 above has shown, however, the definition of a State aid 
remains blurred at the edges, in many instances presenting domestic authorities with the 
conundrum that in order to be certain about whether notification is necessary, it is 
necessary to notify. 
In practice, it would clearly be unworkable for the Commission to scrutinise every potential 
instance of State aid before clearing it as no aid, authorising or prohibiting it. Instead, 
historically, the vast majority of awards have been made under schemes which the 
Commission has approved; this generally obviates the need for scrutiny of individual awards 
to firms.82  
More recently, State aid policy has undergone a procedural revolution. The overarching 
thrust of this has been for the Commission to focus its resources on those areas deemed to 
pose the greatest threat to competition. As a result, a hierarchy of scrutiny has emerged, 
with de minimis aid falling outside Article 87(1) and aid compliant with the GBER no longer 
requiring notification. Among measures that do require notification, there is also a 
hierarchy, with the new simplification package providing for accelerated procedures and 
several of the guidelines (which provide the basis for Commission decision-making for aid 
that fall outside the GBER) distinguishing between standard and in-depth assessment for aid 
schemes. At the top of the scrutiny hierarchy are individual cases which, for a variety of 
reasons, merit case-by-case assessment, even if the aid proposed is offered under an 
authorised scheme. This hierarchy is summarised in Figure 5. 
                                                 
81 The Commission may, of course, uncover unnotified aid (for example through press reports) or be 
alerted to unnotified aid by competitors. 
82 Although, as will be seen, the regional aid and R&D&I guidelines provide for significant individual 
awards to be examined and approved on a case-by-case basis. 
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Figure 5: A hierarchy of scrutiny  a risk-based approach to State aid assessment 
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Source: EPRC research. 
In broad terms, from a compliance perspective, three categories of measure can be 
distinguished:(i) de minimis support; (ii) measures which fit within the GBER; and (iii) 
measures which require notification. This classification gives rise to important issues to be 
addressed at the domestic level, since each of the three groups carries different risks and 
responsibilities. Indeed, the lower the level of scrutiny by the Commission, the higher the 
administrative burden at the national and subnational levels in terms of ensuring 
compliance. On the other hand, the closer the scrutiny required by the Commission, the 
longer the delays involved in implementation. The decision-making process required of 
domestic authorities is summarised in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Determining the presence of State aid and next steps 
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There are three possible outcomes from the analysis of a given measure in the context of 
State aid compliance. The first is a clear finding that no aid is involved (i.e. that at least 
one of the defining criteria is not met), in which case the measure can proceed without 
further ado. A second outcome is that the measure involves State aid; the third is that it 
may involve State aid. In practice, the options for domestic authorities are relatively 
similar in both these situations. 
A first option in both cases is to eliminate the possibility of State aid from the measure. In 
some instances, this might be achieved relatively easily. For example, the precise terms of 
a risk capital scheme could be adjusted to take it outside the scope of Article 87(1) by, for 
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example, ensuring that the activities of the State were conducted according to the private 
investor principle. In other cases it will clearly be more difficult.  
Where the presence of aid is unclear, domestic authorities may seek to clarify the position 
through informal contact with the Commission. A key difficulty here is that such contact 
does not produce a binding decision, but it does alert the Commission to the plans of the 
authority concerned. 
In the case of both clear and possible aid, a further option may be to provide support under 
the de minimis Regulation. This may be an attractive option where the measure does not 
readily fit within the GBER and the amount of aid is sufficiently modest. On the other hand, 
this paper has drawn attention to the onerous monitoring requirements of the Regulation. 
Moreover, and especially in cases where it is unclear whether aid is present at all, there 
may be strong arguments against exhausting the de minimis ceiling. 
An alternative approach would be to ensure that the measure fits within the GBER and 
report it. While this is likely to be a preferred option, where possible, if aid is involved, it is 
less attractive if the presence of aid is unclear, since intervention may be compromised by 
being shoehorned into constraints that are not in fact required. 
Where none of these options is suitable, the only viable route may be to notify. The 
advantage of formal notification of proposed measures to the Commission is that it 
produces a binding decision as to their compatibility with the Treaty. However, the 
associated delays and uncertainty make this an option of last resort for many domestic 
authorities.  
Last, policymakers may simply take a risk and opt to proceed without notification. This is 
arguably rather more risky where the presence of aid is self-evident, but historically has 
been relatively common in the context of rescue and restructuring aid where swift action is 
often paramount and awaiting a Commission decision would undermine the utility of 
government action. However, in less clear-cut instances, there is a case for developing and 
documenting robust arguments as to why a given measure does not involve aid. This 
informed, risk-based approach appears to be passively encouraged by the Commission 
(since it tends to eliminate cases at the margins in which the Commission is not anyway 
greatly interested), but it involves a gamble on the part of domestic authorities that the 
decision will not be challenged and, if it is, that the Commission will share the same view 
of the measure. 
In summary, the main issues for domestic authorities to address are: whether aid can be 
rendered de minimis; whether to adapt a measure as appropriate and report it under the 
GBER; and whether to notify. De minimis aid has already been discussed in some detail 
earlier (see 2.2). The remainder of the discussion on the EU framework for compliance 
deals with the GBER (see 4.1.1) and notification (see 4.1.2). It also includes a brief 
overview of the Commissions simplification package introduced at the end of April 2009 
(see 4.1.3). 
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4.1.1 General Block Exemption Regulat ion 
As part of the rationalisation and simplification of the State aid rules, the Commission 
adopted a General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) in July 2008;83 the GBER entered 
into force on 29 August 2008. This represented the latest stage of a process begun under 
the 1998 Enabling Regulation84 which envisaged the possibility of block exemptions in a 
number of policy areas, namely aid for SMEs, R&D, training, environmental protection and 
regional aid. In practice, block exemption regulations were only adopted for SME and 
training aid (in 2001) employment aid (in 2002) and regional aid (in 2006).  
The main purpose of the block exemption approach is to obviate the need for prior 
notification and approval of aid schemes in areas where the Commission has defined the 
circumstances in which it will find aid to be compatible with the common market. In other 
words, provided that a given measure meets the conditions set out in the Regulation, there 
is a presumption that the measure is compatible with the Treaty.  
The principal rationale for this approach is to reduce the administrative burden on the 
Commission which, in the past, had committed considerable resources to rubber stamping 
aid schemes that national administrators had already taken care to ensure were in line with 
the Commissions published guidelines. There is a considerable incentive for administrators 
to design measures that comply with the GBER, since measures that do not meet the 
precise criteria have to be notified; a potentially lengthy process with an uncertain 
outcome. Importantly, however, the GBER applies only to transparent aid with incentive 
effect.  
In the context of the Regulation, transparency means regional investment aid schemes 
under which it is possible to calculate ex ante the gross grant equivalent (GGE) as a 
percentage of eligible expenditure. Such schemes include grants, interest rate subsidies 
and capped fiscal measures. Schemes which comprise a guarantee element may be 
considered transparent if the Commission has accepted the methodology used to calculate 
the intensity of the guarantee. Several countries (including France and Germany) have 
notified methodologies for calculating the grant-equivalent of measures.85 These 
methodologies have been endorsed by the Commission, which effectively renders aid 
calculated according to these methods transparent.86 This enables the Member State 
concerned to report schemes under the GBER that use the methodology to calculate aid 
values and increases the scope of the GBER to include measures  notably guarantee 
schemes - that would otherwise lack the transparency for exemption. 
                                                 
83 RAPID Press Release (2008) State aid: Commission adopts Regulation automatically approving aid 
for jobs and growth, IP/1110/08 of 7 July; Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 august 2008 
declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Article 87 
and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation), OJEU No L 214/3 of 9 August 2008: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:214:0003:0047:EN:PDF  
84 Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 (now 87 
and 88 respectively) of the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of 
horizontal State aid, OJEU No L 142/1 of 14 May 1998. 
85 Commission Decision N 677a/2007  France: Method to calculate the aid element in public loans, 16 
July 2008; and Commission Decision N 197/2007  Germany: Method to calculate the aid element in 
guarantees, 25 September 2007. 
86 GBER, Article 5(1). 
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Repayable advances are transparent if the total advance does not exceed the aid ceiling 
expressed as a percentage of eligible expenditure. The following are not considered 
transparent:87 aid comprised in capital injections (without prejudice to the specific 
provisions on risk capital); and aid comprised in risk capital measures (except for risk 
capital aid schemes for SMEs that comply with the BER). 
Regarding incentive effect, the GBER only exempts schemes from notification if, prior to 
work on the project starting, the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid. In the 
case of SMEs, fulfilment of this condition is sufficient to show incentive effect.88 In the case 
of large firms, Member States must in addition, and prior to granting aid, verify that the 
documentation provided by the beneficiary establishes the incentive effect of aid on the 
basis of one or more of the following criteria:  
x a material increase in the size of the project/activity due to the aid;  
x a material increase in the scope of the project/activity due to the aid;  
x a material increase in the total amount spent by the beneficiary on the project/activity 
due to the aid;  
x a material increase in the speed of completion of the project/activity due to the aid; 
and/or  
x that the project would not have been carried out as such in the assisted region 
concerned in the absence of aid.89  
These requirements do not apply to fiscal measures granted automatically without any 
discretion on the part of the awarding authorities and where the measure has been adopted 
prior to project start.90 
Ad hoc aid which is used to supplement aid granted on the basis of transparent regional aid 
schemes, and which does not exceed 50 percent of the total aid, is also exempt from 
notification provided that the ad hoc aid fulfils all the criteria of the Regulation.91 This 
provision would enable, for example, a local authority to complement national level 
incentives (subject to the prevailing regional aid ceiling); however, it does not allow for the 
use of ad hoc aid independently, which must be notified and assessed on the basis of the 
Regional aid guidelines. 
The GBER sets out the conditions, eligible expenditure and aid intensities for aid in the 
following policy areas: 
x Regional investment and employment aid 
                                                 
87 GBER, Article 5(2). 
88 GBER, Article 8(2). 
89 GBER, Article 8(3). 
90 GBER, Article 8(4). 
91 GBER, Article 2(5). 
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x SME investment and employment aid 
x Aid for female entrepreneurship 
x Aid for environmental protection 
x Aid for consultancy for SMEs and SME participation in trade fairs 
x Aid in the form of risk capital 
x Aid for research & development and innovation 
x Training aid 
x Aid for disadvantaged and disabled workers 
The GBER requires reference to be made to the GBER in the granting legislation and also 
specifies criteria with respect to maintaining records which must be kept for 10 years. It 
also provides for the Commission to monitor implementation. There must be direct access 
to the implementing legislation from a web link in the reporting document in order to 
ensure that third parties have the opportunity to assess the compatibility of the measure 
with the GBER (as well as the Commission).  
In those IQ-Net partner programmes which do make use of the GBER (and some do not, for 
example, País Vasco and Vlaanderen), there is positive response to the flexibility and room 
for manoeuvre offered. This is considered to be very valuable, alongside the introduction 
of a certain amount of simplification and the potential for accelerated procedures. 
However, the feedback is not all positive  some viewed the GBER as simply a compilation 
of existing rules providing no real benefit and still requiring considerable interpretation. 
The GBERs newness means that it is still regarded with a certain amount of scepticism. 
On the other hand, several IQ-Net partners suspected that they may not be optimising their 
use of GBER, and were interested in exploring the potential for greater use.  
In Denmark, the GBER (known as the super group exemption) is being used, and it was 
originally thought that some standard models of project would emerge which could then 
be used in similar projects in the future. In practice, this has proved to be difficult due to 
the variation and complexity of the projects submitted which often straddle several 
categories in the super group exemption. A major task has been to make regional project 
administrators aware of the need to distinguish between activities within a particular 
project, and, by implication, make applicants describe the proposed activities in sufficient 
detail so the appropriate rules on eligible expenditure and aid intensities can be applied. 
In Italy, a so-called omnibus scheme is in operation instead of using the GBER, over which 
it is considered to have some advantages. The omnibus scheme was notified to and 
approved by the Commission, rather than being reported on the basis of the GBER. 
Importantly, the omnibus scheme has a wider scope  it includes, for example, 
organisational innovation and process innovation for certain services and aid to the 
innovation poles, which are not included in the GBER. Moreover, the omnibus scheme 
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combines a high degree of flexibility with legal certainty; even though the GBER was passed 
after its adoption, the regional authorities perceive a national notified aid scheme to offer 
greater security than the use of the GBER.  
Concerns at the lack of security in using the GBER at the subnational level are not, 
however, universal. In France, national framework legislation has been introduced using the 
GBER as a template to enable any tier of national or subnational authority with the relevant 
competence to offer aid, provided that it is compliant with the GBER.92 This will be 
complemented by software which is being developed to make use of the calculation 
methodologies approved by the Commission so that subnational authorities can make use of 
a wider range of policy instruments under the GBER. 
4.1.2 Notificat ion 
As already mentioned, the scope of the GBER is wide and administrators will have a vested 
interest in trying to fit schemes within it terms. However, there may be circumstances in 
which aid requires notification. These include: 
x schemes which do not meet the precise criteria of the GBER (e.g. with respect to 
transparency) or which are explicitly excluded from the scope of the GBER (e.g. 
regional operating aid); 
x individual awards where the amount of aid / aided investment exceeds the limit in the 
GBER and is subject to individual scrutiny (e.g. large investment projects as defined in 
the regional aid guidelines); 
x ad hoc aid except that complementing aid allowed under the GBER  i.e. aid not offered 
under an explicit scheme; 
x individual cases where the status of a measure as aid is unclear and the domestic 
authority seeks legal certainty that the measure is not aid (or a decision that it is 
compatible). 
It is also worth noting that the GBER is only really of value to those Managing Authorities for 
which aid schemes are a major part of the programme, in which case implementation may 
be straightforward. In many regions this is not so. In Vlaanderen, for example, the 
Structural Funds are not used to finance schemes per se¸ potentially giving rise to a more 
complex range of issues. 
Notified aids are assessed against the relevant guidelines  eg regional aid, environmental 
aid etc. In the absence of a relevant guideline  for instance in the case of culture or 
heritage projects - the aid would be assessed directly against Article 87(3). The approval 
process can be particularly lengthy where there is no obvious precedent for the measure 
concerned and the policy objectives which it seeks to address are not explicitly provided 
                                                 
92For details see: http://www.diact.gouv.fr/fr_1/amenagement_du_territoire_44/aides_aux_entrepri
ses_626/reglementation_europeenne_718/n_ont_1474.html  
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for in any existing guidelines. An example of this is the Scottish Credit Union case,93 which 
took almost two years to approve even though the principles of the scheme would appear to 
be entirely with the Community objectives of economic and social cohesion (indeed it was 
to be co-financed under the Structural Funds) and the maximum annual spend envisaged 
was relatively modest at some £5 million (c. 6 million).  
Within some of the State aid guidelines, there is provision for a standard and a more 
detailed assessment of the measures involved (for example, in the guidelines for R&D&I and 
risk capital). Domestic policymakers faced with the prospect of notifying a measure have a 
vested interest in ensuring that, as far as practicable, the notified measure follows the 
contours of the guidelines and, where relevant, of schemes already approved under those 
guidelines. In short, where possible, the aim should be to notify a compatible regime; 
failure to do so is likely to result in a lengthy decision-making process.  
Notification to the Commission is often preceded by informal contact with a view to 
ascertaining the main issues likely to arise before the formal process begins; informal 
contact may help to shorten the decision-making process. Some domestic authorities 
explicitly use this informal phase to hone a compatible aid notification; moreover, as will 
be seen, this process is effectively being formalised under the simplification package 
described below.  
Figure 7: Summary of Commission Decision-Making for Notified and Unnotified Aid 
 
Note: This diagram contains the main elements only. 
Source: EPRC research. 
The main steps involved following any informal contact with the Commission are 
summarised in Figure 7. As noted, formal notification has the advantage of producing a 
                                                 
93 Commission Decision N 244/2003  United Kingdom: Credit Union Provision of Access to Basic 
Financial Services  Scotland, 6 April 2005.  
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clear decision about: (i) whether the measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of 
Article 87(1); and (ii) if so, whether it can qualify for one of the exemptions from the 
general ban on State aid. The main disadvantage of this option is the length of time taken 
to reach a decision. The deadline for an initial decision is two months from the receipt of a 
completed notification. However, the Commission can easily restart the clock by 
requesting further information just before the deadline expires. Several IQ-Net partners 
criticised this practice, claiming that on occasion the matters raised were pure formalities 
and that it was sometimes done to cover staff turnover. Importantly, if the Commission has 
doubts as to the compatibility of the measure, it must open the investigative procedure, a 
lengthy process involving comments from third parties which is unlikely to yield a decision 
in much under two years.  
Faced with this prospect, and political pressures for speedy implementation, domestic 
authorities may be inclined to proceed anyway, in spite of the possibility that the measure 
may involve State aid. This too carries risks. Aside from political embarrassment and the 
ultimate frustration of policy objectives, it is ultimately the recipient of the aid which pays 
the penalty for unnotified aid which results in a negative decision. In such circumstances, 
the beneficiary may have to reimburse aid already received, with interest, even if this 
would place the undertaking in financial difficulties. 
Domestic authorities may be wary of notification in borderline cases for other reasons. The 
liberalisation agenda of recent years has contributed to a broadening of the State aid 
concept as a wider range of activities have become subject to competition and the role of 
the public sector in the economy has come under increasing scrutiny. Domestic authorities 
may be reluctant to contribute to new precedents, not least since the resulting Pandoras 
box effect may have direct implications for established practices across a range of areas. 
As one State aid specialist put it during the IQ-Net fieldwork research: we have enough to 
do without turning over any stones. On the other hand, it is worth noting that an 
increasingly important source of policy precedents derives from complaints brought by third 
parties, so that a conspiracy of inaction may ultimately be little defence against a further 
widening of the definition. 
The approaches taken to notification among the IQ-Net partner programmes are split evenly 
between: those who had not yet made any notifications at all to the Commission at the 
time of the fieldwork (and were not intending to make use of this channel in future); and 
those who had made numerous notifications or were indeed notifying most of the aid 
granted under their programmes (with only a few regions just having notified one or two 
schemes). This split reflects very different attitudes to the notification process: for some 
IQ-Net partners, it is the last resort after de minimis, GBER and existing schemes have 
been explored; for others, it is seen as the safest way for aid schemes in doubt. 
Programmes which have gone down the route of making many formal notifications of aid 
schemes to the Commission, however, reported a significant resultant administrative 
burden.  
Notification is usually made by a central, national or federal body where this exists; their 
role may simply be to transmit the information drafted by the MA to the Commission. In 
some cases, the national State aid body may make a significant input into the design of a 
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measure with a view to trying to ensure compatibility prior to notification and avoid a 
lengthy decision-making process. 
4.1.3 Simplificat ion package 
It is worth noting here that in April 2009 the Commission adopted a so-called 
Simplification Package aimed at improving the transparency, effectiveness and 
predictability of State aid procedures. This comprises two elements: a Notice on simplified 
procedures for treatment of certain types of aid; and a Best Practices Code on the conduct 
of State aid control proceedings.94 
The Notice on simplified procedures identifies the circumstances in which the Commission 
will take a short-form decision of no aid or no objections, the aim being to reach such 
a decision within 20 working days of notification. Notification must, however, be preceded 
by pre-notification contact, the aim of which is to ensure that any points of information 
are dealt with, enabling the Commission to reach a prima facie decision that it would be in 
a position to approve the measure once formally notified, without further information 
requests. Three categories of aid are, in principle, eligible for the simplified procedure. 
Category 1 measures are those that fall within the standard assessment section of 
existing frameworks or guidelines, but which are not covered by the GBER. These include: 
x risk capital measures, other than private equity investment funding, meeting all the 
requirements of Section 4 of the Risk Capital Guidelines;95 
x some environmental investment aid meeting the conditions of Section 3 of the 
Environmental Aid Guidelines;96 
x specified types of aid under the R&D Guidelines,97 namely: aid for young innovative 
enterprises; aid for innovation clusters; and aid for process and organisational 
innovation in services; 
x ad hoc regional aid which is below the individual notification threshold set out in the 
Regional Aid Guidelines;98 
x rescue and restructuring aid which meets specified substantive criteria under the 
guidelines99 
x export credits that meet the relevant conditions of the Shipbuilding Framework;100 
                                                 
94 These were adopted on 29 April 2009 and are not yet published in the OJ, but are available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/rules.html>  
95 Community guidelines on State aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized 
enterprises, OJEU No. C194/2 of 18 August 2006.  
96 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, OJEU No. C82/1 of 1 April 2008.  
97 Community framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, C323/1 of 30 
December 2006. 
98 Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-13, OJEU No. C54/13 of 4 March 2006. 
99 Community guidelines on State aid for rescue and restructuring firms in difficulty, OJEU No. C 
244/2 of 1 October 2004. 
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x audiovisual support schemes meeting certain criteria under the Cinema 
Communication.101 
Category 2 measures are those corresponding to well-established Commission decision-
making practice. These are defined as those whose features correspond to those of aid 
measures approved in at least three earlier Commission decisions, known as precedent 
decisions102. These include: 
x aid for heritage conservation linked to historic, ancients sites or national monuments 
under Article 87(3)(d) (see 3.1.2 above); 
x aid schemes for theatre, dance and music activities; 
x aid schemes for the promotion of minority languages; 
x aid measures in favour of the publishing industry; 
x aid measures in favour of broadband connectivity in rural areas; 
x guarantee schemes for shipbuilding finance; 
x aid measures fulfilling all the conditions of the GBER but excluded from it because they 
lack transparency (but the gross grant-equivalent methodology has been approved in 
precedent decisions) or because they involve ad hoc aid; 
x measures supporting the development of local infrastructure that do not constitute 
State aid because the measure in question will not affect intra-Community trade. 
In each of these areas, the Notice cites three precedent decisions as a source of guidance. 
However, it is notable that in no case are the decisions cited available in more than two 
languages - typically the language of the country concerned by the decision and either 
English or French. 
The last indent of Category 2 arguably sits rather uneasily; if the pre-notification contact 
had concluded that a measure did not involve aid, it is not evident why it should be notified 
at all. Moreover, it is not clear that the four precedent decisions mentioned will be of great 
practical use in sharpening the definition of State aid, not least since two of the decisions 
are available only in German, another only in Swedish and the fourth in English and Dutch. 
On substance, the commentary in the Notice notes that in order for a measure to be 
considered as not having any effect on intra-Community trade, the precedent decisions 
require a demonstration by the Member State of the following: (i) that the aid does not 
lead to investments being attracted to the regions concerned; (ii) that the goods/services 
                                                                                                                                            
100 Framework on State aid to shipbuilding, OJEU No. C 317/11 of 30 December 2003, as amended and 
extended. 
101 Commission Communication on certain legal aspects relating to cinematographic and other 
audiovisual works, COM (2001) 534 final, Brussels 26 September 2001. 
102 Only decisions carried out in the 10 years preceding pre-notification can be considered precedent 
decisions.  
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produced are purely local and/or have a geographically limited attraction zone; (iii) that 
there is no more than a marginal effect on consumers from neighbouring Member States; 
and (iv) that the market share of the beneficiary is minimal on any relevant definition 
and that the beneficiary does not belong to a wider group of undertakings. The lack of 
quantification associated with impacts being limited, marginal or minimal makes it 
unclear just how much this provision will assist domestic policymakers in practice. 
Looking beyond the simplification package per se, as mentioned earlier, informal contact 
with DG Comp is an important element in ensuring compatibility of a pending formal 
notification. Among the IQ-Net partners, IPI/MISE (Italy) reported that they found these 
contacts helpful, and plan to increase the use of pre-notification contact further in 
future. Indeed, this was one of the key commitments made at a meeting in June 2006 
between DG Comp and the Italian authorities (European Policies Department, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Economy and Finances, and 
representatives from the regional authorities). Issues discussed included: the strong added 
value of pre-notification meetings, particularly for schemes where the Commission has not 
yet defined a clear-cut set of procedures; the value of strengthening the link between pre-
notification and notification through the allocation of a single case handler for both 
procedures, where possible; and the usefulness of enhancing informal contacts, e.g. 
bilateral meetings or via national contact points within DG Comp; and the potential to 
exploit more fully multi-lateral meetings by preparing agendas with more time for the 
presentation and discussion of national cases. The Italian authorities were interested in the 
potential for extending the State aid notification form to include more non-compulsory 
fields, to allow the submission of more information on specific cases. This would reduce the 
need to send annexed documentation and limit clarification requests by DG Comp, which 
are one of the main reasons reported for the excessive length of appraisal procedures. 
The response of many other IQ-Net partners to informal contact with the Commission was, 
in many cases, considerably less positive. A number had used DG Regio as starting point for 
advice, but IQ-Net partner assessments of DG Regios capacity in this field were generally 
not positive.103 Some had found the advice to be unreliable or in conflict with that 
subsequently received from DG Comp, and several were uncomplimentary about the general 
quality of coordination between the two DGs. Regarding informal contact with DG Comp, 
several criticised the Delphic nature of the responses - the lack of clear guidance and non-
binding nature of the opinions received from DG Comp staff, meaning that they had to bear 
the risk of implementing measures in borderline cases. The reluctance to indicate clearly 
that a measure did not involve aid was also a source of frustration, as was the tendency to 
push domestic authorities toward de minimis or the GBER as a way of avoiding having to 
assess whether a measure involved State aid at all.  
The Simplification package is clearly intended to address some of these concerns; it 
remains to be seen whether it will do so in practice.  
                                                 
103 Clearly DG Regio has no role under the simplification package, but is often a general point of 
contact on State aid issues for Managing Authorities.  
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4.2 Managing compliance: domestic arrangements 
4.2.1 Structures for managing compliance 
Overall responsibility for ensuring compliance of Structural Funds programmes and projects 
with the State aid rules is generally taken by the programmes Managing Authorities (MAs), 
assisted by Intermediate Bodies where these have delegated MA tasks. The specific 
arrangements for ensuring compliance with the State aid rules depend on the national and 
regional administrative frameworks/Structural Funds management and implementation 
systems which are in operation (see Annex for fiches relating to the main responsible bodies 
in the IQ-Net partner programmes).  
Different emphases are placed on the responsibility of the beneficiary to ensure compliance 
of their application with State aid rules and the responsibility of the MA to check this 
compliance; and within IQ-Net partner programmes, the focus on who is seen to be most at 
risk from errors varies  ranging from the beneficiary, who would be financially penalised, 
to the MA, who would have to recoup the funds and satisfy auditors, or the Member State. 
Feedback from fieldwork suggests that awareness of the relevance of State aid rules to the 
Structural Funds programmes is higher during this programme period than in previous 
periods. Compliance with State aid rules is further up the agenda for a number of reasons, 
and is also a greater cause for concern. Greater awareness of the rules coupled with their 
complexity means that many programmes are operated with considerable uncertainty 
regarding State aid compliance, largely because there is insufficient expertise and capacity 
to engage with the issues at the level required by the complexity of the legislation. 
Programmes are responding to this in a number of ways: by turning to specialist 
bodies/units with specific State aid expertise (where these exist), by setting up new bodies 
or processes to develop specialised expertise (e.g. meetings and networks); and by building 
capacity and expertise through training.   
(i) The role of national competition authorities  
A general point to note about State aid compliance is that the Commission has no authority 
over the form of national mechanisms for ensuring compliance; this contrasts with the 
administration of the Structural Funds where Member States must designate bodies with 
responsibility for fulfilling a range of functions, such a management, audit, payment and so 
on. 
A consequence of this is that the arrangements within Member States are quite diverse. In 
some countries there is considerable expertise within different tiers of government. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, the State aid unit at BERR (the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform) has an overarching role and participates in the 
Commission multilateral meetings on State aid, but is complemented by specialised bodies 
in Scotland and Wales (which have also on occasion directly represented United Kingdom 
interests at multilateral meetings). Elsewhere, responsibility is more diffuse, relying on 
expertise within particular administrations, and sometimes a single individual.  
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In the new Member States, the position tends to be more formal. This is essentially a legacy 
of the pre-accession period during which applicant countries were required to adopt and 
implement the acquis communautaire in the field of State aids, essentially by transposing 
the body of State aid rules and guidelines into national legislation. Each country was also 
required to designate a national competition authority, the role of which mirrored that of 
the European Commission in scrutinising and policing State aid. On accession, the State aid 
rules became directly applicable in the new Member States and the task of ensuring 
compliance was transferred from the national competition authorities to the European 
Commission. Clearly, these national authorities built up considerable expertise in the pre-
accession period and although their formal role has changed, they continue to perform 
important functions with respect to State aid compliance both in internal affairs and in 
relations with the European Commission.  
x In the Czech Republic, the Office for the Protection of Competition is the central 
authority for coordination, advice, consulting and monitoring on State aid and its tasks, 
and the rights and duties of aid providers, are enshrined in legislation.104  
x The position in Poland is broadly similar, with the Office for Competition and Consumer 
Protection retaining a formal internal and external role in compliance under legislation 
amended at the time of accession;105 the performance of this role is particularly 
complex since some 3,500 authorities are competent to grant aid in Poland.  
x In Slovenia, a greater degree of control has been retained by the State Aid Monitoring 
Department (SAMD), a special department within the Ministry of Finance, which 
inherited many of its functions from the pre-accession Commission for State Aid 
Control.106 
Where they exist, national State aid authorities typically play a coordinating role, and are 
involved in advice provision and preparation of guidelines, handling formal communications 
with the Commission, contributing to the legislative process, and monitoring and reporting 
activities. The national competition authority may concentrate on contributing to EU level 
discussions and negotiations rather than being involved in day-to-day compliance issues 
(e.g. as in Portugal). Alternatively, they may play a more active internal role, as in 
Denmark, where DECA (the Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority) and the regional 
administrators can obtain advice from an inter-departmental administrative committee of 
State aid experts associated with the Danish Competition Authority. 
Where their role varies markedly is in the provision of opinions. Most do not have a 
statutory role, and can provide only expert opinions and recommendations to enquirers. 
The exception among the IQ-Net partner programmes is in Slovenia, where the State Aid 
Monitoring Department (SAMD) at the Ministry of Finance will provide a binding opinion on 
                                                 
104 Bednár, J. (2005) The State aid control procedure in the Czech Republic, European State Aid Law 
Quarterly, 2. pp 265-7. 
105 Pelka, P. (2004) State aid control in Poland, European State Aid Law Quarterly, 3, pp 380-4. 
106 JagodiĆ-LekoĆeviĆ, L. (2004) State aid control in Slovenia, European State Aid Law Quarterly, 3, 
pp 375-9. 
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State aid under the block exemption and de minimis rules, and there is a formal process in 
case of disagreement between the SAMD and awarding bodies. 
It is worth noting that in Italy, the establishment of a single, central national body to act as 
a contact point for DG Comp was suggested by the Commission to the Italian authorities, 
apparently on the basis of evidence that, where in place, such structures have resulted in a 
higher quality of notifications and a significant reduction of the timescale for approval.  
(ii) State aid expertise within programmes 
There is wide variation in the level of resources and expertise available to the MAs (and 
within them) to help them make decisions on State aid issues, and to check compliance. 
Many IQ-Net partners have specialist State aid units working alongside the MAs and 
Intermediary Bodies (see Annex). In Greece, for example, when examining the compliance 
of specific aid schemes, the MAs can ask for the opinion of the State Aid Unit (MOKE) within 
the Centre of International and European Economic Law (CIEEL). The Unit was set up in 
2002 to provide specialised consulting services in the State aid sector. CIEEL operates as a 
private legal entity (and also designated as a European Documentation Centre) with 
operational and financial autonomy, under the supervision of the Minister of Economy and 
Finance. In Sachsen-Anhalt, funding from the Structural Funds is allocated only either once 
a notification process has been undertaken or once the central Land State aid unit has been 
consulted as to a projects conformity with State aid rules.  
Other IQ-Net partners rely on State aid specialists or legal experts within the MA itself, 
either within or outside the MA function. In Finland, for example, there is a State Aid unit 
within the MA (the Ministry of Employment and the Economy). In Germany, each Land 
Ministry has its own State aid expert unit which provides advice to the Intermediate and 
implementing bodies, if they have any queries relating to State aid rules. In Nordrhein- 
Westfalen, expertise is also available from the NRW Bank, which undertakes various 
technical checks on behalf of the MA, checks project applications in order to assess their 
State aid status from the programmes perspective (as well as to assess various other 
Structural Funds related issues), and gives its opinion to the Intermediate Body. 
State aid expertise may lie within the organisation that carries out the MA role, but outside 
the MA function. For example, in Vlaanderen, there is no official State aid unit, but the 
Europe Economy Directorate mainly makes use of State aid expertise within the Agencys 
Economic Support Directorate. Similarly, while the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and 
Communications in Sweden has a State aid unit, expertise at the MA, Tillväxtverket 
(formerly known as Nutek), is mostly outside Tillväxtverkets MA function. Nevertheless, 
frequent cooperation takes place between the MA and Tillväxtverkets State aid expert.  
At Tillväxtverkets programme support office (which provides support for the eight regional 
programme offices), State aid knowledge is mostly dependent on legal advisors. Within the 
MAs regional offices, expertise is based on staff experience gained over the years. This is 
common to many IQ-Net partner programmes, where the role of State aid expert may have 
arisen informally, through being involved in several problematic project applications, for 
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example, and where State aid responsibilities are shared with other tasks (e.g. in Poland 
and Scotland).  
Some programmes are increasingly involving legal services to help with compliance issues, 
and are seeing potential beneficiaries do likewise. For example, in ĦlĎskie, the regional 
government is currently looking to appoint experts (ideally from a legal background). 
There are problems associated with over-dependence on support from State aid units which 
are outside the Structural Funds functions of a MA. These units may be very small and lack 
resources, they may be approached late in the application process, or they may be relied 
upon in place of the MA engaging fully with the issues. There is evidence that State aid 
units would like to see that appropriate guidance is available to projects early on in their 
development process, allowing them to be framed appropriately from the start, reflecting 
their concern that they may hold up projects which come to their attention too late.  
4.2.2 Training and capacity building 
Managing Authorities and Intermediate Bodies with State aid compliance responsibilities in 
the IQ-Net partner regions use a range of methods to increase knowledge and awareness 
among on State aid rules. This has included capacity-building, tailored workshops and 
seminars, and lengthier dedicated training sessions. This is in addition to the publication of 
guidelines, checklists, vademecum and manuals aimed at the MAs, IBs and applicants.  
In some cases, the intention is to increase the capacity of MA or Intermediate Body staff 
dealing with State aid issues, thus reducing dependence on the existing specialised State 
aid units (which are often very small). For example, in Austria, project applicants have 
been frequently referring directly to the BMWA (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Arbeit/Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour) on State aid related issues, increasing the 
workload at the federal level. As a consequence, the BMWA started to run seminars to 
increase knowledge on State aid issues; for example, a seminar was run in January 2009 for 
the Austrian Regionalmanagements107. In Wales, there is similarly an emphasis on capacity 
building for WEFOs Project Development Officers, who are responsible for examining 
individual projects and assessing whether there is potential for State aid. They have 
recourse to the Welsh Assembly Governments State Aid Unit and legal services when they 
are unsure or where there are issues on which they need expert advice, but the plan is to 
build up confidence, with the aim that the State Aid Unit would only be brought in at the 
next level, to provide additional back-up and a second opinion on grey areas.  
In Lombardia, it was recognised that not all sectoral or cross-sectoral DGs have the same 
competences in relation to State aids, a problem potentially exacerbated by the change of 
focus of the programme (and thus a change in the DGs/offices involved) compared to the 
previous period. The MA considered that this could become a contentious area, and decided 
to undertake a capacity building programme. This training programme was carried out with 
                                                 
107 The Austrian Regionalmanagements (regional management offices) were set up in the mid-1990s to 
stimulate an integrated approach to bottom-up regional development. They provide consultancy 
services on funding possibilities and serve more generally as intermediary bodies between the 
different levels of government and funding agencies. 
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the support of IPI and was tailored to the State aid content of the OP, with the aim of 
ensuring compliance within the very architecture of the programme; all personnel 
involved in the implementation of the programme participated (see Box 5). 
Box 5: Training on State aids under the Lombardia 2007-13 RCE OP 
Day one: overview of EU Treaty norms and main derogations; definitions; concepts of aid scheme and 
individual aid; notification obligations, procedures and exemption regulations; applicable rules for 
regional, horizontal and sectoral aids. 
Day two: definition of SME; de minimis aids; temporary measures for the economic and financial 
crisis. 
Day three: General Block Exemption Regulation. 
Day four: guarantees; reference interest rate; grant-equivalent calculations; cofinancing of aid 
schemes in the Lombardia 2007-13 ROP ERDF. 
Day five: analysis of specific themes and schemes eg: omnibus schemes notified by Ministry of 
Economic Development; Article 87(3)(d); infrastructure investments; SGEI; and broadband 
investments. 
In addition to special training initiatives to build up capacity and expertise, programmes 
provide opportunities for staff to exchange knowledge and experience, and discuss issues 
through the use of specialised committees, working groups and networks.  
In Greece, a Coordination Committee has been set up in an attempt to overcome the 
coordination problems faced by the CSF Managing Authority (of the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance) during the 2000-06 period. A Coordination Committee was introduced for 2007-13, 
to coordinate the planning and implementation of State aid co-financed actions carried out 
by different bodies and ministries. The members of the Committee represent all bodies 
involved in State aid actions under EU co-financed programmes.  
In Sweden, State aid expertise among Tillväxtverkets regional offices has developed 
informally, i.e. based on the staff experience built up over time through dealing with cases. 
However, from March 2009, representatives from each of the eight regional offices are set 
to meet regularly to discuss State aid issues with the aim of improving competence. In 
addition, the case handling officers (who process project applications in the regional 
programme offices) meet twice a year in Stockholm to discuss specific issues of concern, 
including State aid. These meetings are also attended by a representative of the Ministry of 
Enterprise, Energy and Communications and by Tillväxtverkets State aid expert. There has 
been some discussion of developing State aid competence based on a model with specific 
State aid groups gathering representatives across the different Ministries/regions. However, 
until now the approach has relied on the existing structure and regular 
discussions/meetings. 
Even when there is no formal training or capacity building taking place, existing processes 
may allow an informal or experience-based build up of expertise on State aid issues. For 
example, although there is currently no specific training with respect to State aid issues in 
Keski-Suomi, State aid rules are discussed amongst the Intermediate Bodies when they get 
together for project group meetings. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, a Land working group has 
been set up in relation to State aid, made up of the State aid experts from the different 
Ministries, plus the NRW Bank. The working group aims to develop a common language and 
definitions, and joint approaches to specific types of issues and cases. In the United 
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Kingdom, the OffPAT State Aid Technical Group provides a forum for the discussion of State 
aid issues (although with a wider coverage than Structural Funds programmes).  
4.2.3 Procedures to help ensure compliance within programmes 
Most IQ-Net partners agree that ensuring the compatibility of Structural Funds co-funded 
schemes and projects with State aid rules is a problematic area. This is despite the fact 
that only a few IQ-Net partners had so far experienced State aid issues being highlighted as 
a problem (in terms of processes or specific projects) during audit. Attitudes to how 
seriously the issue of compliance is taken range along a spectrum. At one extreme is the 
approach that advocates doing as much as possible to comply, but if the rules really do not 
suit, then flout the rules and take the risk. At the other end of the spectrum, some 
countries (e.g. Slovenia) have carried out stringent internal checks on State aid compliance 
processes. However, the potential for ambiguity and multiple interpretations of the rules 
has led to many programmes taking a cautious approach. MAs are attempting to reduce the 
risk associated with the treatment of State aids in a number of ways: 
x Ensuring compliance as early in the programme process as possible, i.e. at the level of 
the programme. Compliance is considered to be established at OP stage in Portugal, 
where the intention under the National OP for Competitiveness Factors (the key 
business support programme in Portugal) is that compatibility between national and 
community rules is established when designing the programme. Thus, compliance with 
State aid rules is automatically ensured as long as the projects comply with the 
incentive scheme regulations. Similarly in País Vasco, at the programme formulation 
stage, when the operations/projects were selected for inclusion in the Diputación Foral 
de Bizkaia component of the programme, the Structural Funds team screened the 
submissions to ensure compliance with all EU rules, including on State aid. In Greece, 
ROP State aid schemes are centrally designed so that they fall within exemptions. 
x Trying to lock-in compliance at the call for proposals/tenders stage. In Greece, there 
is a coordination procedure for calls for proposals which are checked before they are 
issued for potential State aid problems. A draft of the call is forwarded by the 
responsible IB to the MA of the OP, and in turn to the National Coordination Authority, 
for it to express its opinion. In the case of State aid actions where the criterion of their 
compliance with the State aid rules is included in the call for proposals, the MA 
examines whether the type of aid falls into the application field of the exemption 
regulations, or whether a formal notification of the aid to the Commission is needed. 
Upstream compliance (i.e. not devolved to project applicants, but built up-stream in 
the tenders) is also sought in Italy at tender stage. In the Lombardia programme, the 
officials within each sectoral DG involved in implementing the various measures check 
that projects are in line with the calls for tenders and thus comply with State aid 
legislation. Sachsen-Anhalt has developed a documentary framework that aims to 
ensure that EU rules are respected for all the 175 budget lines included in the OP, and 
insists that all bodies that wish to obtain Structural Fund funding must conform to this 
framework. 
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x Use of formal notification as the safest way for aid schemes in doubt. The Greek public 
authorities, for example, have preferred to use the formal notification procedure for 
individual aid schemes in doubt, in order not to take risks. This is seen to have created 
a significant administrative burden to the public authorities (as well as to the 
Commission), and led to significant delays in the implementation of State aid actions 
(creating serious challenges in terms of the application of n+3/n+2). Similarly, in 
Finland, most schemes are notified.  
x Notification of umbrella schemes. In Italy, MISE has notified an omnibus R&D scheme of 
c. 6 million for the period up to 2013. Each Italian region can decide whether or not to 
use the omnibus scheme, including for non co-financed measures. The Lombardia 
programme is using the R&D omnibus scheme, which essentially covers all R&D&I 
measures under the programme and is the main aid scheme in the programme. This 
operates within the confines of the national Italian omnibus scheme, adapting it as 
relevant. The Lowlands and Uplands Scotland programme is also considering 
introduction of umbrella notifications under several programme priorities, and it is also 
a possibility in Wales (possibly aligned under the Strategic Frameworks). 
x Tighter controls at project application stage, through greater liaison with applicants 
(as in Denmark), strengthened application forms (Scotland) and more consistent use of 
checklists (in many IQ-Net partner regions, including Vlaanderen, País Vasco, Austria 
and Nordrhein-Westfalen, where a working group has produced checklists that must be 
used by the Intermediate Bodies in checking that all formal and legal requirements are 
met in relation to projects. These checklists relate to: project applications; checks on 
intermediate statements on the use of funds; checks on final statements on the use of 
funds).  
x Use of legal services. In North East England, the Regional Development Agency (RDA), 
ONE North East, has State aid expertise in its legal team, who have overall 
responsibility for compliance. The legal team is a resource for the delivery side of the 
RDA, and they issue guidelines, circulate information etc. A person in the legal team 
sits on the national, BERR-led State aid working group. In the Stĥední ąechy ROP, when 
checking project applications with respect to State aid compliance, if there is any 
ambiguity, the project proposal is checked with the Regional Councils lawyer; in 
addition, external evaluators/experts might be engaged to obtain another evaluative 
opinion.   
x More stringent efforts to protect themselves in the event of future audits, for example 
by ensuring better record-keeping. This may include keeping records of the decision-
making process that took place i.e. how it was decided that a project or scheme was 
compliant, ensuring that the process followed is at least free of criticism. Again, this 
has significant resource implications for programmes, where dedicated State aid 
resources are very limited.  
x Stricter monitoring and follow-up. In País Vasco, verifications are undertaken to ensure 
compliance with State aid rules prior to certification of statements of expenditure; this 
process includes a questionnaire with a checklist covering whether the service or good 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 24(2)          European Policies Research Centre 51
EU Cohesion Policy and State Aid Compliance 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 24(2)          European Policies Research Centre 52
has been provided, whether public procurement or State aid rules are being complied 
with etc. On-site visits are also made by an independent company. In North East 
England, Mazars, the consultancy firm appointed to help with monitoring, checks the 
applicants systems for monitoring. In Sachsen-Anhalt, de minimis projects are often 
selected for on-the-spot project checking visits because they are categorised as being 
of potentially higher risk. 
x Some programmes may make efforts to restructure projects where it is thought that aid 
issues might arise; others avoid tricky projects altogether. In Finland, for example, 
Tekes uses only domestic funding to fund business incubators, which are considered to 
be potentially problematic. In the Czech Republic, where a very cautious approach is 
being taken, a relatively steep decrease in the volume of granted State aid can be 
observed since the accession of the EU in 2004 in comparison to the previous period.108 
5. ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper has been to explore the issues surrounding the compliance of EU 
Cohesion policy with the State aid rules. It has focused on three core aspects: (i) the 
definition of State aids (ii) interpretation of the exceptions to the general prohibition on 
State aid; and (iii) the mechanisms operated at EU and domestic levels to ensure 
compliance. The aim of this final section is to draw out some of the key trends and tensions 
to emerge from this discussion. 
(i) State aid principles drafted over half a century ago are often difficult  
to apply today. 
It is not clear precisely what was intended by the authors of the Treaty in drafting the State 
aid provisions, save that government intervention should not frustrate the establishment of 
the common market through the use of essentially protectionist subsidies. The basic text 
setting out State aid discipline lacks precision, but was anyway drawn up in an altogether 
different economic and social context. The boundary between the public and private 
sectors has become increasingly blurred in recent times, with the private sector frequently 
involved in the delivery of services which had previously been the preserve of the State, 
and public bodies, such as universities, increasingly involved in commercial activities. Areas 
such as healthcare provision and infrastructure raise many complex issues, as do support for 
organisations running cultural, leisure or certain social services and projects undertaken 
using public private partnerships. Many such activities are the mainstay of Structural Fund 
programmes, but the State aid rules are ill-suited to their assessment and there is a sense 
in which both the Commission and the Member States conspire to circle carefully around 
Pandoras Box, all aware that non-notification may not be consistent with a strict 
                                                 
108 The absolute volume of granted State aid decreased by about 80 percent in 2004 compared to 
2003. In 2007, the absolute volume of State aid granted in the Czech Republic reached  938 million, 
corresponding to 37 percent of the absolute volume in 2003. Although these figures include also State 
aids not granted under the Structural Funds, the numbers show a significant change in the approach 
to State aid issues in the Czech Republic: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/stat_tables.html#2  
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interpretation of the rules, but wary of the complexities that may be unleashed by close 
scrutiny. 
(ii) In practice, the definit ion of State aid has become increasingly 
conflated with issues of compatibility. 
The architecture of Article 87 is clear in setting out a prohibition of State aid (paragraph 1) 
and outlining the exceptions to this ban provision (paragraph 3). However, a precise 
definition of what constitutes State aid under Article 87(1) remains elusive; this is a source 
of frustration and insecurity for many domestic policymakers, some of whom perceive the 
rules to be increasingly ambiguous.  
The Commissions capacity to limit the notion of State aid is constrained by the precedents 
set in the case law of the Court of Justice. Court rulings have tended to widen the 
definition, by emphasising that all aid distorts competition, although smaller amounts might 
distort it less, and taking a broad interpretation of the effects of a measure on intra-EU 
trade. The effect of this is that the concept of State aid has the potential to include a vast 
array of interventions, many of which, although theoretically meeting the criteria, would 
not be considered to be of any real significance in terms of their effects on the internal 
market; the resource implications of this extensive interpretation are huge. 
In response, rather than tighten the definition of State aid (Article 87(1)), Commission 
action has centred on defining the circumstances in which aid is compatible (Article 87(3)). 
The last decade or so has been a highly active period in Commission policymaking during 
which it has increased the scope of compatible aid, while simultaneously limiting the need 
for notification. As a result, instead of focusing on issues of definition in borderline cases, it 
actively encourages domestic authorities to make use of the de minimis facility or the GBER 
where the status of measures as State aid is unclear. 
Matters of principle aside, there are practical consequences of this since measures which 
may not involve aid at all (but cannot easily be cleared because of the looseness of the 
definition) may be subject to the modest expenditure limits (and administrative burden) of 
the de minimis regulation or constrained by the straightjacket of rules designed for quite 
another purpose. 
Against this background, there is arguably a need for a more rigorous analysis of 
competition impacts and a consideration of whether whole categories of measure  for 
example, some essentially social measures, could readily be excluded from scrutiny. 
(iii) There is greater awareness of State aid compliance issues in the 
current planning period than in the past. 
There is considerable evidence that State aid issues are being taken more seriously in the 
current planning period than previously and that there is greater awareness of, and 
expertise in, the rules than before. Historically, there has been a tendency among many at 
the subnational level to associate State aid with direct support for private firms; there is 
increasing recognition that involvement in economic activity is the central criterion rather 
than the legal status of the recipient. 
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This trend is partly a result of the change in the Structural Funds regulations which makes 
compliance with the State aid rules the responsibility of the Managing Authority (although 
the formal position under the Treaty remains unchanged). In parallel, there has been a 
seismic shift in approach to compliance at the European level with scrutiny of individual 
measures by the Commission increasingly replaced with a self certification approach. For 
the domestic authorities, the trade-off in this arrangement is that of speedier 
implementation against devolution of responsibility for ensuring compatibility and 
monitoring of implementation  with all the administrative burden which these tasks imply. 
Of necessity, this requires a greater understanding of the regulatory context. 
Alongside this, both the Commission and many bodies within the Member States have 
conducted intensive training and awareness campaigns designed to inform all relevant 
authorities of the scope and possibilities for intervention provided for under the rules, as 
well as the risks of non-compliance. Notwithstanding this, there is still a tendency for some 
policymakers to assume that the State aids rules concern only incentive schemes for firms 
and that, provided such support complies with the GBER, no wider issues arise.  
(iv) Compliance with the State aid rules is a major source of anxiety for 
many domestic policymakers. 
The heightened awareness of the State aid rules among Managing Authorities has also 
engendered higher levels of anxiety about compliance; where previously the emphasis was 
on ensuring that obvious cases of State aid  such as incentives to firms  were compliant, 
now there is a greater recognition that there is potential for State aid to be present in 
almost any co-financed project. 
State aid authorities in many Member States remain concerned at levels of awareness and 
compliance within their jurisdictions. Almost all those interviewed could point to actual or 
past examples which would not bear close examination under the State aid rules. In some 
cases this was due to deeply embedded administrative and other practices; in others, a 
deliberate flouting of the rules had been driven by political considerations, with the 
mandate of politicians often too short to await the uncertain outcome of the notification 
process. Elsewhere, there was not, or had not been sufficient buy in to ensuring 
compliance at senior levels in the administration.  
(v) There are significant asymmetries of risk in the compliance process. 
These asymmetries operate at a number of levels. As described in the paper, the 
notification requirement is tautological in nature: in order to know whether it is necessary 
to notify, it is necessary to notify. However, in many respects, the incentive to notify is not 
great  the process is lengthy and the outcome uncertain; moreover, the chances of non-
notification being detected and punished are arguably relatively small. In addition, in this 
eventuality, the penalty (political embarrassment aside) is largely borne by the recipient of 
illegal aid, which may have to reimburse it. It is worth stressing here that notification is 
undertaken by the Member State, and not the potential beneficiary, so that an undertaking 
which feared that the aid it was to receive might not be compliant would be forced to take 
this risk or withdraw from the transaction.  
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Although the ultimate risk is borne by the beneficiary in the sense that reimbursement may 
be required, many domestic policymakers perceived there to be a disproportionate degree 
of risk in their responsibility for decisions. Some Managing Authorities were critical of the 
way in which State aid authorities hedged their advice with caveats and stressed that the 
ultimate decision was not theirs. Similarly, many criticised the Commission services for the 
often Delphic nature of the guidance given, and always under the cover of a personal and 
non-binding opinion. Nevertheless, it is clear that the many thousands of emails generated 
in this process are carefully preserved to provide credible deniability should blame 
subsequently be apportioned. 
(vi) The technical demands of compliance are considerable. 
In a number of areas the technical demands of compliance with the State aid rules are 
perceived to be excessive, especially for subnational authorities, which rarely have the 
specialised resources required.  
In general, considerable resources are required to keep abreast of changes. The current 
rules alone run to over 500 pages, but the interpretation of those rules in Commission 
decisions and Court of Justice rulings extends far beyond this. Moreover, while transparency 
of Commission decision-making has improved beyond measure in the last decade or so 
(notably with the publication of its decisions in the form of a letter to the Member State), 
the Commission does not systematically highlight what it perceives to be landmark 
decisions nor does it update regulations and guidelines to take account of such decisions or 
judgments of the Courts.  
A further issue concerns the language of decision-making. It is evident that DG Comp 
experiences some difficulties in dealing with the languages of some of the new Member 
States. Moreover, decisions addressed to countries are not always in the language of the 
country concerned, which is the source of some irritation. In addition, even the so-called 
precedent decisions highlighted in the simplification package are only available in one or 
two languages, limiting their accessibility for many policymakers. 
Last, in specific areas of policy the technical expertise required to interpret and implement 
the rules is considerable. This is particularly so in areas such as risk capital aid or the 
development of methods to calculate the aid element in opaque forms of aid. It is also true 
in areas such as R&D&I aid which has become increasingly important in regions which have 
lost or reduced assisted areas, and where investment aid used to be the mainstay of 
support. 
(vii) The constraints imposed by State compliance may frustrate the 
achievement of the objectives of Cohesion policy. 
The obligation to comply with the State aid rules does not always sit easily with the 
objectives of Cohesion policy. Two specific areas of policy stand out in this regard: R&D&I 
policy and financial engineering.  
In spite of the fact that the R&D&I guidelines are cast in terms of the Barcelona Council aim 
of increasing spending to three percent of GDP by 2010, there is considerable evidence that 
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IQ-Net partners have difficulty in addressing the Lisbon criteria in their programmes owing 
to the constraints of the R&D&I rules. Not only are they perceived to be complex to 
administer (the phases of the research process presenting particular difficulties), but the 
levels of aid which can be offered are often too low and the scope of eligible expenditure 
too narrow to be attractive. 
In the context of financial engineering measures, there was a widespread degree of 
exasperation among the IQ-Net partners. While on the one hand DG Regio has actively 
promoted the use of more innovative instruments, the requisite degree of coordination with 
respect to ensuring the compliance of measures such as JESSICA and JEREMIE has not been 
in evidence. One experienced State aid unit official noted that in many years of service, 
the negotiation of these instruments with DG Comp was the longest he had ever been 
involved in. 
More generally, the State aid rules were often viewed as a source of frustration among 
Managing Authorities who claimed that it was already difficult enough to find good 
projects without the limiting field by imposing additional restrictions. Partly related, there 
is also evidence to suggest that pressures to spend in a timely fashion under n+2/3 may 
result in projects that raise State aid issues being set aside or rejected because the delays 
inherent in notification and approval by DG Comp were unpredictable and could result in a 
loss of Structural Funds receipts. 
(viii) State aid compliance under the Structural Funds may be greater than 
under purely domestic policies. 
Although State aid compliance is viewed as fraught with difficulties and an extremely 
complex area, there is some evidence to suggest that compliance is more likely under 
cofinanced projects than purely domestic ones. Several examples were given of 
interventions which domestic authorities had opted not to cofinance because of fears that 
the instruments in question would not bear close scrutiny from a State aid perspective. In 
short, the audit process (or the anticipation thereof) built into Cohesion policy 
administration may result in a higher degree of compliance with the State aid rules than 
would otherwise be the case. 
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ANNEX: MAIN ACTORS INVOLVED IN ENSURING STATE AID COMPLIANCE UNDER 
THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS PROGRAMMES IN IQ-NET PARTNER REGIONS 
AUSTRIA 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
Federal  Department for Co-ordination of EU-State 
Aid Rules (Abteilung für EU-
Beihilfenrecht) at the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Labour 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Arbeit, BMWA) 
Notifies new schemes to COM.  
Makes recommendations.  
Federal There are four federal Intermediate 
bodies - Förderstellen (FS), such as the 
ERP Fund and the FFG (Austrian Research 
Promotion Agency). 
See Land-level Intermediate Bodies. 
Land  SF Managing Authorities Final responsibility for compliance, but 
role relatively limited.  
Land Intermediate Bodies - Förderstellen. In 
the IQ-Net partner regions, the main 
Länder-FS are ecoplus and WST3 in 
Niederösterreich, and SFG in Steiermark 
Project applicants complete checklists 
for the FS, assuring compliance with 
State aid rules.  
 
BELGIUM: FLANDERS 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
Federal None in relation to the Vlaanderen 
programme. 
None in relation to the Vlaanderen 
programme 
Regional Programme Monitoring Committee Final responsibility for State aid issues 
under Vlaanderen programme 
Regional Europe Economy Directorate of 
Enterprise Vlaanderen, which acts as MA 
and programme secretariat 
Day-to-day responsibility for state aid 
issues, drafted State aid checklist  
Regional Enterprise Vlaanderen Economic Support 
Directorate 
State aid expertise available; is 
consulted on the programmes State aid 
texts 
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CZECH REPUBLIC 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National State Aid Department of the Office for 
the Protection of Competition (OPC) 
(Úĥad pro ochranu hospodáĥské soutĕe, 
ÚOHS) 
 
Advisory, consultancy and monitoring 
role to public subsidy providers. Liaise 
with COM. Monitoring State aids.  
National State aid specialists within the National 
Coordination Authority of the NSRF 
(NCA) and the Budget Department both 
within the Ministry for Regional 
Development (MRD) 
NCA provides guidance (studies, 
seminars) and communicates with 
Commission.  Budget Dept. deals with 
registration of State aids, support to 
ROP MAs.  
National Working Group of NCA (MA delegates) Disseminates information on State aids 
(also other topics). Meets monthly. 
Nat/Reg SF Managing Authorities Have overall responsibility for ensuring 
compliance. Check projects for 
compliance. Use of specialised legal 
experts is common. 
Regional  Working Group State Aid and Legislation 
has been set up by the ROP MAs, 
consisting of ROPs lawyers and 
sometimes attended by representatives 
of the OPC.  
Discusses and solves State aid questions 
(meets monthly).  
 Working Group within the OP Enterprise 
and Innovations, attended by the OPC 
representatives 
Discusses and solves very concrete State 
aid questions. 
 Beneficiary Responsible for providing true 
information on application and provides 
statutory declaration in case of de 
minimis aid.  
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DENMARK 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National Danish Enterprise and Construction 
Authority (DECA)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Responsible for final checking of all 
applications for compliance with 
regulations before granting support. Two 
different units responsible for the 
eastern and western parts of the 
country. Provides training and early stage 
advice on applications.  
Individual case officers are responsible 
for checking applications for State aid 
compliance, but in the current 
programming period a small number of 
State aid experts have emerged who 
serve as back-up for case officers. 
National Structural Fund Programmes Controller 
Unit  
Focuses on compliance with State aid 
regulations. 
Regional  SF Managing Authorities Responsible for ensuring that the 
projects they recommend for funding 
comply with all relevant regulations, 
including those concerning State aid. 
Networks 
etc. 
Inter-departmental administrative 
committee of State aid experts 
associated with the Danish Competition 
Authority 
Provides advice. 
 
FINLAND 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
(i.e. Managing Authority for ERDF 
programmes). Normally, such issues 
within Ministry are dealt by State Aid 
Unit.  
Overall responsibility in terms of 
regulatory framework for State aid, 
including provision of guidance for IBs.  
Regional  Intermediate Bodies at the regional level 
(e.g. Regional Councils, T&E centres, 
Tekes, Finnvera, environmental and road 
administrations, state provincial office). 
Responsible for ensuring compliance with 
State aid regulations. Provide guidance 
for projects. Responsible for providing 
relevant information with respect to 
State aid in electronic EURA2007 system. 
Regional Beneficiaries Responsible for providing relevant 
information with respect to State aid in 
the electronic EURA2007 system. 
Networks 
etc: 
For instance, in Keski-Suomi, State aid 
rules are discussed amongst the 
Intermediate Bodies when they get 
together for project group meetings.   
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FRANCE 
Level Body Main responsibilities 
National 
level 
SGAE (secretariat general for European 
affairs), MICA unit (internal market, 
consumers, competition, State aid and 
armaments) 
Notifies new schemes to COM.  
Formal interface with French permanent 
representation. 
Circulates new information, advice 
guidelines etc. to national and 
subnational bodies 
National 
level 
DIACT State aid specialist (other 
ministries, notably industry, play an 
important informal and advisory role) 
Provides advice, guidance and training, 
but no statutory controls 
Regional 
level 
Préfet de région and Trésorerie payeur 
général  
Have a general duty to ensure the 
legality of the actions of the State at the 
regional level and of local authorities; 
this implicitly includes State aid rules. 
Reg/ 
subregion 
level 
Services instructeurs  Project applicants complete checklists, 
assuring compliance with State aid rules.  
 
GERMANY: SACHSEN-ANHALT 
Level Main actors  Main responsibilities 
Land The Intermediate Bodies and 
implementing bodies which implement 
the different schemes and instruments 
co-financed by the SF OPs (i.e. units in 
Land Ministries, and public agencies 
subordinate to these Ministries, plus the 
Land Bank) 
Responsible for checking project 
applications to ensure that they conform 
to State aid rules and for formally 
deciding that a project is eligible for EU 
funding. 
Land The Lands central State aid advisory 
unit, located in the Ministry for the 
Economy and Labour. 
Answers queries from IBs. Channels draft 
State aid schemes from different Land 
ministries to the Federal Finance 
Ministry, which formally notifies them to 
DG Comp.  
Land OP Managing Authority for the ERDF and 
ESF OPs located in the Land Ministry of 
Finance 
Developed a documentary framework 
that aims to ensure that EU rules are 
respected for all the 175 budget lines 
included in the OP. 
Checks the information provided by 
Intermediate Bodies on approved 
projects.  
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GERMANY: NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
Land Intermediate Bodies which responsible 
for committing funds to projects 
Formal responsibility for checking that 
project applications conform to EU State 
aid rules. 
Land Each Land Ministry has its own State aid 
expert unit 
Provides advice to the Intermediate and 
implementing bodies, if they have any 
queries relating to State aid rules. 
Land NRW Bank Undertakes technical checks on behalf of 
the  MA - checks project applications to 
assess their State aid status from the 
programmes perspective (as well as to 
assess various other SF related issues), 
and gives its opinion to the Intermediate 
Body.  
Land A Land working group has been set up in 
relation to State aid, and is made up of 
the State aid experts from the different 
Ministries plus the NRW Bank 
Ensures a consistent approach to the 
interpretation of State aid rules across 
all Ministries. 
 
GREECE 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
Directorate general of Economic Policy  
Department of European Union 
Notifies aid to DG Comp.  
National State Aid Unit (MOKE) within the Centre 
of International and European Economic 
Law (CIEEL) 
Provides advice to MAs on details of aid 
schemes.  
National National Coordination Authority (NCA), 
through the Special Service for 
Institutional Support and the Special Co-
ordination Service, Unit D: Competition 
and State aids 
Responsible for ensuring compliance of 
the OPs with the Community State aid 
rules. Sets out general implementing 
rules and procedures for State aid 
actions in manual. Gives opinion on calls 
for proposals. 
National Coordination Committee for State aid co-
financed actions   
Coordinate the planning and 
implementation of State aid co-financed 
actions that are implemented by 
different bodies and ministries.  
Nat/reg OP and ROP Managing Authorities Ensure compliance of specific State aid 
schemes. Supervise IBs.  
Nat/reg Authorized public authorities 
(Intermediate Bodies) 
Ensure compliance of individual private 
projects. Check applications forms and 
perform verification checks.  
 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 24(2)          European Policies Research Centre 61
EU Cohesion Policy and State Aid Compliance 
ITALY 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National Ministry of Economic Development 
(Ministero per lo Sviluppo Economico  
MISE) 
Administration of the passwords for the 
electronic notifications to DG Comp to 
national and regional authorities  
Management of the national database to 
track de minimis aid  
Responsible authority for the notified 
omnibus scheme for R&D  
Responsible for the drafting of the 
annual report on aid schemes which the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends to DG 
Comp 
National A dedicated office within the 
Department for Cohesion Policies of MISE  
Deals with the coordination and support 
of other administrations, especially 
regional, on State aids and on the 
compatibility with competition rules 
more generally 
National IPI Supports MISE for R&C programme 
National Department for Community Policies Involved in simplification of notification 
procedures.  
Nat/reg Sectoral or cross-sectoral 
DGs/Departments that under each 
regional or national administration are in 
charge of the operation of the measures 
included in the programmes and, as 
regards State aids, their State aids 
compliance 
A number of officials within each 
sectoral DG involved in the programme 
undertake project selection and check 
that the projects are in line with what 
required by the calls for tenders.  
Regional Managing Authority  i.e. the DG for 
Industry, SME and cooperation in 
Lombardia 
Priority referents or measure managers 
within the MA have also the responsibility 
of ensuring compliance with State aid 
rules.  
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POLAND - ĦLčSKIE 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection (UrzĎd Ochrony Konkurencji i 
Konsumentów  UOKiK) 
Can provide beneficiaries with 
opinions/advice on potential State aid 
issues and give its interpretation of 
particular terms and definitions. Plays 
key role in State aid notification.  
Responsible for monitoring State aid. It 
collects and disseminates information.  
National Ministry of Regional Development (the 
MA for the Human Capital OP and the key 
coordinating body for the regional MAs of 
the ROPs) 
Supervisory, guidance 
Regional Within Marshals Office, State aid 
responsibilities are shared with other 
tasks across staff in an ad hoc way in 
both the Regional Development and the 
ESF units. 
Responsible for ensuring compliance. 
Check applications for State aid issues. 
Regional Financial department in regional 
government 
Reviews funding flowing though body for 
State aid. 
 
PORTUGAL 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National national competition authority Contributes to legislative process, not 
involved in ensuring compliance.  
National IFDR - Financial Institute for Regional 
Development 
Provision of advice. 
Nat/reg MAs of national/regional operational 
programmes. Responsibility can be 
delegated to an Intermediary Body  
Ensures that co-funded operations are 
compliant with State aid rules. 
National A national commission is responsible for 
designing and reviewing the governing 
legislation on  incentive schemes, a core 
aspect of state aid in Portugal 
Advises on the compliance of the 
incentive schemes with national and 
community rules on State aid. 
Nat/reg Intermediate bodies  At project analysis stage, the 
intermediary body confirms the 
compatibility of the aid in terms of the 
main State aid requirements. 
Networks A technical support network Promotes compliance with State aid 
rules. 
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SLOVENIA 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National State Aid Monitoring Department (SAMD) 
at the Ministry of Finance 
Overall responsibility for ensuring 
compliance with the State aid rules. 
Same procedure for cases with or without 
SFs contribution. Also: notification of 
State aid to COM; handles, assesses and 
provides binding opinion on State aid 
that entails a block exemption and aid 
under the de minimis rule; monitoring of 
granted aids (de minimis, State aid); 
control over evidence (notified aids, 
granted aids, de minimis aids); training 
and advice for State aid grantors. Checks 
all public tenders for compliance. 
National Government Office for Local Self-
Government and Regional Policy (GOSP)  
the MA  
Checks if tenders prepared are in 
accordance with the existing State aid 
schemes. 
Nat/regio
nal 
Intermediate Bodies and direct budget 
users (ministries) or its agents (public 
agencies, public funds)  
Preparation of calls for tenders. Must 
guarantee that calls for tenders are in 
accordance with the existing State aid 
rules.  
 Project applicants  Sign a funding contract in which they 
declare that/if they received State aid 
and how much. 
 
SPAIN  PAÍS VASCO 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National MA  the ERDF unit within the DG for 
Community Funds (Ministry of Economy 
and Finance).  
Overall responsibility for ensuring 
compliance with the State aid rules 
Region/pr
ovince 
Cohesion policy teams in the regional 
governments, and, in the case of the Pais 
Vasco, provinces (Diputacion Foral de 
Bizkaia), which are designated as 
intermediary bodies 
Share task with MA. Directly responsible 
for all aspects of management, including 
compliance with State aid. Check all 
projects to be funded.  
National National competition commission in Spain  Responsible for general competition 
policy issues, but does not play a role in 
the implementation of Cohesion policy.  
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SWEDEN 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National State Aid Unit within the Ministry of 
Enterprise, Energy and Communications 
Responsible for ensuring compliance with 
State Aid rules  
National Managing Authority (i.e. Tillväxtverket)  Provides advice and training to the 
regions and other bodies with respect to 
State Aid issues  
National Tillväxtverket  State Aid expert (outside 
MA function) 
Provides advice to MA function of 
Tillväxtverket 
Regional Case handling officers at the eight 
regional programme offices of 
Tillväxtverket 
Process application forms using State Aid 
checklist.  
There are plans to meet regularly to 
discuss State Aid issues with the aim of 
improving competence in this area. 
Regional Beneficiary 
 
Responsible for providing relevant 
information with respect to State Aid in 
the application form. 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
Level Main actors Main responsibilities 
National Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory reform (BERR) State aid unit 
Key focal point for state aid issues 
nationally 
Regional  England  RDAs (MAs) Responsible for ensuring State aid 
compliance, process and check 
applications. 
Regional Mazars consultancy firm  Checks applicants systems and provides 
advice during pre-engagement visit. 
Regional Scotland  Scottish Government, State 
Aid Unit  
Provide advice. 
Regional Scotland  Scottish Government (MA) Responsible for ensuring State aid 
compliance. 
Regional Scotland  IABs (ESEP for the Lowlands 
and Uplands Scotland programmes and 
HIPP for the Highlands and Islands) 
Process and check applications, provide 
initial guidance. 
Regional Wales  Welsh Assembly Government 
state aid unit and legal services 
Provide advice. 
Regional Wales  WEFO (MA) Responsible for ensuring State aid 
compliance. Check projects.  
 Applicants Some larger applicants may consult in-
house state aid expertise (e.g. local 
authorities, enterprise agencies)  
Working 
groups 
BERR-led state aid working group, OffPAT 
State Aid Technical Group 
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Improving the Quality of Structural Funds 
 Programme Management 
through Exchange of Experience 
IQ-Net is a network of Convergence and Regional Competitiveness programmes actively 
exchanging experience on practical programming issues. It involves a programme of 
research and debate on topical themes relating to Structural Funds programme design, 
management and delivery, culminating in twice-yearly meetings of members. IQ-Net was 
established in 1996 and has successfully completed three periods of operation: 1996-99, 
1999-2002 and 2002-07. The fourth phase was launched on 1 July 2007 (Phase IV, 2007-10). 
IQ-Net Meetings  
25 partners meetings and a special 10th 
anniversary conference have been held in ten 
European countries during 12 years of operation of 
the Network. Meetings are held at approximately 
six-month intervals and are open to IQ-Net 
partners and to observers interested in joining the 
Network. The meetings are designed to facilitate 
direct exchange of experience on selected issues, 
through the presentation of briefing papers, 
plenary discussions, workshop sessions and study 
visits in the hosting regions. 
 
 
IQ-Net Website 
The IQ-Net Website is the Networks main vehicle of communication for partners and the 
public (www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet). The launch of Phase IV has been accompanied by an 
extensive redesign of the site which comprises two sections: 
 
 
Partner Intranet Pages available exclusively to IQ-
Net members.  
 
Public Pages which provide information on the 
Networks activities and meetings, allow the 
download of IQ-Net Reports and Bulletins, and 
provide a news section on issues relevant to the 
Network. 
 
The Partners section of the website provides exclusive services to members of the Network, 
including access to all materials prepared for the IQ-Net meetings, a list of EU27 links 
(programmes, institutions, economics and statistics etc.), partners contact details, a partners 
blog and other items of interest. 
 
IQ-Net Reports 
The IQ-Net Reports form the basis for the discussions at each IQ-Net meeting. They present 
applied and practical information in a style accessible to policy-makers, programme 
executives and administrators. The reports can be downloaded, at no charge, from the IQ-
Net website. To date, around 25 thematic papers have been produced on both functional 
issues (e.g. management arrangements, partnership, information and communication, 
monitoring systems) and thematic issues (e.g. innovation, enterprise development, 
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tourism). A similar number of papers have also been produced to review developments in 
the implementation of the Networks partner programmes. 
 
IQ-Net Thematic Papers 
x The Financial Management, Control and Audit of EU Cohesion Policy 
x From Environmental Sustainability to Sustainable Development? Making Concepts 
Tangible in Structural Funds Programmes 
x Making sense of European Cohesion Policy: 2007-13 on-going evaluation and monitoring 
x Turning ideas into action: the implementation of 2007-13 programmes 
x The New Generation of Operational Programmes, 2007-2013 
x National Strategic Reference Frameworks and OPs, 2007-2013 
x Preparations for the Programme Period 2007-13 
x Territorial Cohesion and Structural Funds 
x Cohesion Policy Funding for Innovation and the Knowledge Economy 
x The Added Value of Structural Funds 
x Information, Publicity and Communication 
x Mid-term Evaluation of the 2000-06 Programmes 
x Mainstreaming Horizontal Themes into Structural Fund Programming 
x The Structural Funds: Facilitating the Information Society 
x Information into Intelligence: Monitoring for Effective Structural Fund Programming 
x At the Starting Block: Review of the New Programmes 
x Tourism and Structural Funds 
x Preparations for the New Programmes 
x The New Regulations and Programming 
x Strategic Approaches to Regional Innovation 
x Effective Responses to Job Creation 
x The Evolution of Programmes and Future Prospects 
x Equal Opportunities in Structural Fund Programmes 
x The Contribution of Meso-Partnerships to Structural Fund Implementation 
x Regional Environmental Integration: Changing Perceptions and Practice  
x Structural Fund Synergies: ERDF and ESF 
x The Interim Evaluation of Programmes 
x Monitoring and Evaluation: Principles and Practice 
x Generating Good Projects 
x RTD and Innovation in Programmes 
x Managing the Structural Funds  Institutionalising Good Practice 
x Synthesis of Strategies 1994-96 
IQ-Net Bulletin 
The IQ-Net Bulletin promotes the dissemination of the Networks activities 
and results. Thirteen issues have been published to date, over the period 
from 1996 to 2007. Bulletins are published using a standard format, with 
each providing summaries of the research undertaken and reports on the 
discussions which take place at IQ-Net meetings. The Bulletins can be 
downloaded from the IQ-Net website (public pages). A printed version is also 
sent out to the IQ-Net mailing list.  
 
Admission to the IQ-Net Network is open to national and regional Structural Funds Managing 
Authorities and programme secretariats. For further information or to express an interest, 
contact Professor John Bachtler (john.bachtler@strath.ac.uk) or Laura Polverari 
(laura.polverari@strath.ac.uk 
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